Will Judge Jack B. Schmetterer rule according to law or rule to protect a former Judge, Lawrence Fisher, from prosecution?

In re:                           Bankruptcy No. 93-07643

Eugene Walter Alpern             Chapter 11

                                 Judge Jack B. Schmetterer
 
 

NOW COMES the Debtor, EUGENE ALPERN ("EUGENE") and, along with his affidavit, submits the following:

Judge Lawrence Fisher ("FISHER"), the purported Chapter 7 trustee in this Chapter 11 proceeding, continues his practice of committing a "fraud upon this court" ⁽¹⁾ in the filing of his Response to this court, and also a "fraud upon the court" in the other courts that he included as his exhibits.

As a part of this Reply, EUGENE incorporates all documents filed in this case, and including all of the letters sent by EUGENE to Judge Jack B. Schmetterer.

To start with, FISHER presents a false background that does not represent the facts of the case. He has fabricated an imaginary background that is based on a void judgment. Without this fabrication, he cannot support any of the actions that he had taken, or any of the exhibits he enclosed with his Response. It is clear and well-established law that all orders based on void orders are themselves void. Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (1962) ("if the underlying judgment is void, the judgment based upon it is also void."). Since the original 91-D-5122 judgment was void, all succeeding court actions based on this void judgment, including 93-B-7643, are themselves void, of no legal force or effect.

FISHER falsely alleges in his Response that a "decree of divorce was entered" in case no. 91-D-5122 (Cook County) [page 1]. However this allegation is not supported by the record of the 91-D-5122 case; in fact it is impeached by an inspection of the record of that case.

The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the record of the case must affirmatively support any claim of subject-matter jurisdiction. Six judges have inspected the record of the 91-D-5122 case and all six judges reported that a valid Petition of Dissolution of Marriage does not exist as a part of the record of the case. ⁽²⁾ The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a valid Petition of Dissolution of Marriage is a mandatory requirement for subject-matter jurisdiction to be conferred upon the divorce court, and that the record of the case must contain such a Petition. Without a valid Petition in the record of the case, no subject-matter jurisdiction was ever conferred upon the court, and therefore the orders entered by the 91-D-5122 trial court were void ab initio and no valid decree of divorce could be entered. Without a valid decree of divorce, no valid divorce could be granted, and none ever was.

At no time has FISHER informed this court, or any court, of the lack of a valid Petition in the 91-D-5122 case, and has not informed this court that the Proof of Claims filed in this court were based on void orders. FISHER omitted [fn1] to inform this court that a "fraud upon this court" and a "fraud upon the estate" was filed in this case by Phyllis Alpern, Allen S. Gabe, and Robert K. Blain, assisted by their attorneys Benjamin Hyink and Regina A. Scannicchio; FISHER committed a "fraud upon this court" and a "fraud upon the estate" by not informing this court that void judgments were filed in this case [fn1]. FISHER became a party to, and an accessory to, the filing of fraudulent claims against this estate. FISHER engaged in a scheme to defraud this court and to defraud EUGENE's estate. By his silence [fn.1], FISHER has committed a "fraud upon this court".

The filing of false and fraudulent Proofs of Claims against a Bankruptcy estate is a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§152 and 3671.

For FISHER to establish that he had not committed a "fraud upon this court" and a "fraud upon the estate", he must first inspect the record of the 91-D-5122 trial court, find that a valid Petition for Dissolution of Marriage is a part of the record of that case, and that six(6) judges were in error in their finding that a Petition of Dissolution of Marriage was not a part of the record of the 91-D-5122 case. For this court to find that the judgments filed as claims in this court were valid, this court will have to find that a valid Petition for Dissolution of Marriage is a part of the record of case no. 91-D-5122 and that six(6) judges were in error in reporting that no Petition for Dissolution of Marriage is a part of the record of case no. 91-D-5122. Until such time as proof of a valid Petition is a part of the record of the 91-D-5122 case, is presented to a competent court, the law holds that no subject-matter jurisdiction was ever conferred upon the 91-D-5122 court and therefore that all judgments were and are void ab initio. Brown, supra.

FISHER has never established, nor has any judge, that a valid Petition for Dissolution of Marriage was a part of the record of the 91-D-5122 case.

Since no judge has the lawful authority to validate a void order, Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920); In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D. Illinois, 1989), and since the record of the 91-D-5122 court impeaches any claim of subject-matter jurisdiction, this judge only has the lawful authority to vacate all orders issued in the 91-D-5122 court and in this court.

An inspection of the record of the 91-D-5122 court and the record of this court impeaches any claim that the 91-D-5122 court held, or this court holds, subject-matter jurisdiction.

FISHER falsely alleges [fn1] that EUGENE resisted a charge of contempt of court. Without the 91-D-5122 court having subject-matter jurisdiction, there was no valid contempt of court charge. EUGENE had a legal right to contest a false charge of contempt of court by a judge without subject-matter jurisdiction. FISHER wants EUGENE to agree to void orders, orders issued without subject-matter jurisdiction, orders that have no validity. The false charge of contempt of court had no validity. FISHER failed to disclose [fn1] to this court that the purported charge of contempt of court was issued by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction.

FISHER stated that EUGENE's personal property was not a part of the estate [pg. 10], then alleges that the silver was a potential estate asset [pg. 11]. All of EUGENE's personal property either was a potential estate asset, or was not, and should have been treated equally. FISHER has no lawful authority to make this determination on his own. FISHER never informed [fn1] this Court, on his own, that he had taken EUGENE's estate property to his home. Only after later questioning by EUGENE, did FISHER for the first time admit that he had taken EUGENE's estate property to his home.

FISHER falsely states that void orders are final, valid, and binding orders [pg. 12]; FISHER knows that void orders are never final, valid, nor binding orders; they have no legal force or effect. FISHER proceeds to put into practice orders that have no legal basis in law, as a part of his scheme of fraud upon the court.

It is clear and well-established law that challenges of void orders are never defeated by res judicata, as FISHER falsely states [fn1] [pg. 12]. Since a void order has no legal force or effect, it cannot be res judicata to anything. Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (1948).

FISHER's Response is full of misrepresentations without any proof or law to support his falsehoods. Allegations by an officer of the court without proof are other examples of "fraud upon the court" by an attorney. FISHER presents to this Court only excuses for his actions, actions which cannot be supported by law or the record of the case.

An officer of the court has taken an oath to be truthful at all times; to be truthful one must make full and complete disclosure [fn1], not partial disclosures or no disclosure [fn1]. Armentrout, supra. FISHER has a fiduciary duty to be truthful to the court and to the law. Since he acted without lawful authority, he has made false and fraudulent statements [fn1] in his Response, statements not supported by any law or statute, since none exist.

These are just a few of the many false allegations made by FISHER in his Response. Only one false allegation is sufficient to create a "fraud upon the court" and to make the entire 93-B-7643 action void. There is no need to expose all of FISHER's false allegations. FISHER used his Response to further his "fraud upon the court" and his "fraud upon this estate".

Since a "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire case, the Response by FISHER must be stricken as all orders from this court, or any subsequent court are void, as none of the courts held subject-matter jurisdiction. No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order. U.S. v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997 (1943); Root Refining Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (1948); In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D. Illinois, 1989); Schwarz v. Schwarz, 27 Ill.2d 140, 188 N.E.2d 673 (1963); Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill. 614 (1896); Skelly Oil v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App.79, 87 (1st Dist. 1949).

The orders of the Bankruptcy action became void for, including but not limited to, the "fraud upon the court" by FISHER and his associates, and the 91-D-5122 Petitioner's attorneys.

Void orders do not have to be declared void to be a void order. A void order is void even before vacature or reversal. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920).

Many officers of the court confuse a voidable order with a void order. A void order is void as a matter of law, and is void ab initio. No person has the lawful authority to validate a void order. In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D. Illinois, 1989) ("a void act cannot be ratified."). The 91-D-5122 and the 93-B-7643 orders referred to are void ab initio orders, not voidable orders.

At the time of the filing the Proofs of Claims based on the void judgments of the 91-D-5122 court, the 91-D-5122 action was proceeding in the First District Appellate Court. Upon filing this 93-B-7643 action, the Federal Automatic Stay [11 U.S.C. 362] immediately went into effect. At no time has the Automatic Stay been lifted. The proceeding in the Appellate Court was in violation of the Federal Automatic Stay and all orders issued therein were, and are, void. The presentation of the 91-D-5122 court's void orders to this court by Phyllis Alpern, Allen S. Gabe, and Robert K. Blain, assisted by their attorneys Benjamin Hyink and Regina Scannicchio, and with the collusion of, complicity of, conspiracy of, and connivance of, FISHER was an attempt to defraud EUGENE's estate, and was also a "fraud upon this court".

The Proofs of Claims are, as a matter of law, void ab initio, of no legal force or effect. In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D. Illinois, 1989) ("Acts in violation of the automatic stay imposed by §362(a) are void ab initio"). The filing of these false Proofs of Claims are a fraud upon the Bankruptcy Court, and are acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. §152 and §3571.

The purported creditors, Phyllis Alpern, Allen S. Gabe, and Robert K. Blain, and their attorneys, Benjamin Hyink and Regina Scannicchio, have engaged in acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571. Judge FISHER and attorney Linda A. Green assisted, aided and abetted, conspired with, acted in collusion with, acted in complicity with, and/or connived with the purported creditors to engage in acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571.

This court should report all of the above parties, and all parties who have knowledge of their acts, to the proper authorities for prosecution of their engaging in acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 152 and 3571.

It is clear and well established law that a void order is void even before reversal or vacature. Vallely v. Northern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 U.S. 348, 41 S.Ct. 116 (1920); In re Garcia, 109 B.R. 335 (N.D. Illinois, 1989). There is nothing lawful that Judge James nor any other judge can do to give the orders of the 93-B-7643 any validity. The orders are, as a matter of law, void ab initio.

EUGENE has consistently denied that the 91-D-5122 court held subject-matter jurisdiction. As a statutory proceeding, governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, it becomes the burden of the parties claiming that the court held subject-matter jurisdiction to prove that the court held subject-matter jurisdiction. Bindell v. City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1991) ("the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it."); Ballard v. Fred E. Rawlins, M.D., Inc., 101 Ill.App.601, 428 N.E.2d 532 (1981); Stephens v. Northern Indiana Pub. Serv., 87 Ill.App.3d 961, 409 N.E.2d 423 (1980). At no time has there been any proof submitted that the court held subject-matter jurisdiction; only evidence found is that the court did not hold subject-matter jurisdiction.

EUGENE has denied, and has continuously denied, that this court or any court in which the 91-D-5122 or the 93-B-7643 actions have been taken have subject-matter jurisdiction.

At no time did Judge James, FISHER, or any other officer of the court comply with the requirements established by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to be applied to non-represented litigants. FISHER, and all other officers of the court, have no authority to violate the law. Courts have held that no judge has any authority to violate the public policy of this Land.

EUGENE has found no allegation in FISHER's Response that Judge Thomas James did not give the appearance of partiality in the conduct of his proceedings, or that the public which witnessed the appearance of partiality, and filed affidavits to his appearance of partiality, was not correct in their opinion.

EUGENE believes that FISHER's silence [fn1] on the public's belief that Judge James gave the appearance of partiality is FISHER's acceptance of the charge of appearance of partiality by Judge James.

In his response, FISHER admits performing legal services [pg. 11], and billing the legal fees attributed to those legal services to the estate. He alleges that the services were performed for the estate but presents no law or statute that permits his performing those specific services on behalf of the estate. No authority authorizes FISHER to perform those services on behalf of the estate, especially an estate wherein FISHER accepts void judgments against the estate and wherein FISHER commits a "fraud upon the estate" and "fraud upon this court". Since no authority permitted those actions, and since the actions were taken by him on behalf of Judge James, and since Judge James permitted those charges to be paid by the estate, and since Judge James had no authority to permit those charges to be paid by the estate, both FISHER and Judge James personally benefited by those legal services. Wherein the estate was defrauded by unauthorized charges, i.e., FISHER performed personal services for Judge James, and charged the estate for the services provided to Judge James. Judge James accepted a bribe from FISHER.

The making of false statements by any officer of the court, the making of partial disclosure, the omission of full and complete facts, the silence by FISHER as to the law and proof of his allegations has all been defined by courts as fraud. The above is another example wherein FISHER has engaged in a "fraud upon the court".

Based on FISHER's admissions, none of which is supported by any statute or caselaw, FISHER has engaged in the act of bribing Judge James. FISHER has not shown that he had any lawful authority to engage in any of the acts that he acknowledges that he engaged in; therefore, by his own admission, FISHER had engaged in bribing Judge Thomas James.

FISHER engaged in acts of bribing a judge, in violation of Federal law.

Since this court was without subject-matter jurisdiction for multiple reasons, including but not limited to, (1) FISHER's acceptance of void judgments as claims against the estate, (2) due to the "fraud upon the court" by FISHER and the attorneys Gabe, Blain, Hyink, and Scannicchio, (3) the payment of a bribe by FISHER to Judge Thomas James and the acceptance of the bribe by Judge Thomas James, (4) the "fraud upon the estate" by FISHER and the attorneys Gabe, Blain, Hyink, and Scannicchio, (5) the appearance of partiality by Judge James, which has never been controverted and which under the Supreme Law of the Land disqualified Judge James from hearing and ruling in this case, the orders issued by Judge James, including but not limited to, appointing Judge FISHER as a Chapter 7 trustee in this Chapter 11 proceeding are void, and all actions taken by FISHER are without the authority of the law.

FISHER has not produced any evidence that the 91-D-5122 trial court held subject-matter jurisdiction, and that any of the orders/judgments of that court are valid. It is clear and well-established law that any court involved in a statutory proceeding is presumed not to have subject-matter jurisdiction, until and unless the party claiming the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, proves that the court actually holds subject-matter jurisdiction. No court has found that the 91-D-5122 court had subject-matter jurisdiction.

FISHER has not controverted any statement made by EUGENE, as the filing of a Response containing false information does not support any objection to EUGENE's factual statements.

Since Judge James did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, due to, among other reasons, FISHER's activities, FISHER could not be lawfully appointed a trustee. The relief requested in the "PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF LAWRENCE FISHER AS PURPORTED TRUSTEE" should be granted, and FISHER should be ordered to fully comply with EUGENE's "PETITION FOR COMPLETE, DETAILED ACCOUNTING OF ESTATE PROPERTY".

FISHER was so interested in defrauding this estate that he deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly ignored his fiduciary duty to the estate to first determine if the purported judgments filed with the Proofs of Claims were valid. Or did FISHER know the judgments were invalid, and that if he brought this invalidity to the attention of the Court, he would not be able to defraud this estate.

A Response by an attorney should reflect the truth; the Response filed in this case is a fabrication of falsehoods. FISHER has engaged in acts which have brought the courts and the legal profession in disrepute. All officers of the court who aid and abet, assist, or connive with, FISHER, in any of his acts not supported by law or statute, have engaged in acts which have brought the courts and the legal profession in disrepute.

                               Respectfully submitted,
 

                               ______________________
                               Eugene Alpern, in pro per

Eugene Alpern
P.O. Box 672
Morton Grove, IL 60053-0672

The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an inspection of the record of the case must affirmatively find that a valid Petition for Dissolution of Marriage must be a part of the record of the case, in order to confer any subject-matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. In re Cash, 383 Ill. 409, 429 (1943) ("Jurisdiction in special statutory proceedings is never presumed. It must affirmatively appear from the record."); Wabash Area Development, Inc. v. Ind. Com., 88 Ill.2d 392 (1981); C. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Galt, 133 Ill. 657, 668 (1890); Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930).

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