EUGENE ALPERN
P.O. Box 672
Morton Grove, IL 60053

June 5, 1997
 

Ms. Mary Robinson, Administrator
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission
130 E. Randolph Dr. - #1500
Chicago, IL 60601-6219
 

Dear Ms. Robinson: Re: Caryl Jacobs Gabe

The following charges of attorney misconduct are being filed against attorney Caryl Jacobs Gabe for the counts stated below.

Attorney Caryl Jacobs Gabe operates under the Professional Corporation name of Gabe, Gabe & Associates, P.C.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her "law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the conduct of all lawyers in the firm conforms to these Rules." Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRPC") Rule 5.1(a).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the law firm of Gabe, Gabe & Associates, P.C. did not have in place any measure that complied with IRPC Rule 5.1(a).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she had a duty to comply with IRPC Rule 5.1(c)(2). She did not, at any time, act to mitigate or to avoid to take required remedial action of the ethical misconduct detailed in these charges.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she was willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 5.1(c)(2).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that a lawyer from her law firm held an ex parte meeting with Judge Gustafson on September 18, 1990 for the purpose of checking the court files of case no. 90-D-2724 with Judge Gustafson, the assigned judge in that case. [Exhibit A].

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that it is unlawful to hold an ex parte meeting without notice to the opposite party.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm had willingly and intentionally engaged in an ex parte meeting with the presiding judge of case no. 90-D-2724, an action that was at that time before the court.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm had willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 3.3(d).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm appeared before Judge Gustafson on March 26, 1991 in case no. 90-D-2724 under the name of attorney Neil A. Robin.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm did not have any lawful authority to appear before Judge Gustafson and to misrepresent to the court that they were another attorney from another law firm and represented a client of the other law firm, without filing an appearance on behalf of the Petitioner.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm was willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 8.4.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that neither she, any attorney with Gabe, Gabe & Associates, P.C., nor her law firm had filed an appearance in case no. 90-D-2724.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the reasons for appearing before Judge Gustafson as attorney Neil A. Robin were for the purpose of committing a fraud upon the court, manipulating the judicial process, and to judge-shop.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 3.1, 8.4(a)(4), and 8.4(a)(5).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm had a legal duty to file an appearance with the Circuit Court of Cook County before appearing in a legal action.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violations of IRPC Rule 8.4.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm did not notify the opposition that they held an ex parte hearing on March 26, 1991, and that without notice of motion, all orders, as a matter of law, from that proceeding are void ab initio and a legal nullity.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm willingly and intentionally created a void ab initio order in case no 90-D-2724 on March 26, 1991, and then continued to engage in actions to enforce a void order without any lawful authority.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 3.1.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the Order issued by Judge Gustafson on March 26, 1991, was void ab initio, and had no legal force or effect.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm was willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 3.3.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in committing a fraud upon the court, by appearing as another attorney in a 90-D-2724 court proceeding, a proceeding in which the opposite party had not been given notice.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 3.3 and 8.4.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that Local Rule 90-D-2 of the Domestic Relations Division was in effect at all pertinent times. [Exhibit B].

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm, when it filed a second identical Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, under case no. 91-D-5122 on April 4, 1991, was required to notify the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County that the case fell under Local Rule 90-D-2 of the Domestic Relations Division and had to be assigned to the same calendar judge as the previously filed case, namely Judge Gustafson.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm did not notify the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County that the 91-D-5122 case fell within the requirements of Local Rule 90-D-2 of the Domestic Relations Division, and did not notify the Clerk that the new case had to be assigned to Calendar Judge Gustafson, who was the Calendar Judge in the 90-D-2724 action.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 3.3.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the assigned calendar judge in the 91-D-5122 action, i.e. Judge Kaplan, was not the calendar judge to which the 90-D-2724 case was assigned, i.e. Judge Gustafson.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that Judge Kaplan was not the Calendar Judge in the 90-D-2724 action, and therefore had no lawful authority to hear or rule in the second identical action.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions to judge-shop, to engage in fraudulent concealment, and making misrepresentations to the Court.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in violation of IRPC Rules 3.3, 8.3(b), 8.4(a)(1), 8.4(a)(2), 8.4(a)(4), 8.4(a)(5), and 8.4(a)(7).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally involved in judge-shopping, as they now, through their unlawful manipulation of the court process, had the same identical case before two judges, and could pick the judge of their choice.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm was engaged in actions in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 8.4(a)(4).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 7.5(d) þLawyers may state or imply that they practice in partnership or other organization only when that is the fact.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the use of letterhead stating only Gabe, Gabe & Associates implied a partnership and was an unregistered assumed name if the notice of Professional Corporation was not a part of the name, when they were, in fact, actually practicing under the corporate name of Gabe, Gabe & Associates, P.C. [Exhibit C].

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that neither she nor her law firm had registered the partnership of Gabe, Gabe & Associates under the assumed name act.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were intentionally and willingly engaged in violation of IRPC Rule 8.4.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have no legal authority to charge a client for time allegedly spent in responding to a charge of attorney misconduct filed before the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. [Exhibit C]. The Illinois Supreme Court held to this decision in a previous disciplinary record and recommendation.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the fee petition filed by her law firm in case no. 91-D-5122 did not comply with court decisions applying to lawful fee petitions. As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm had filed a fee petition that was fraudulent. (For a review of court decisions on attorney fees, see David P. Pasulka, An Illinois Attorney's Guide to Fee Dispute Cases, Illinois Bar Journal, Vol. 84, December 1996, pg. 622.)

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm forfeit their legal fees whenever they engage in any actions in violation of the IRPC.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the fee petition presented to the 91-D-5122 court was a misrepresentation to the court, and that her law firm was engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 3.3(a)(1).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that during the entire action known as 91-D-5122, that she and her law firm were knowingly and intentionally prosecuting a void action that had the effect of harassing the Respondent. As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm was engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 3.1.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she was willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 8.3(a) in not reporting the misconduct of another attorney in her law firm, namely Allen Sherwin Gabe.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of SCR 721 (c) which states that "No corporation or association or limited liability company shall engage in the practice of law in Illinois, or open or maintain an establishment for that purpose in Illinois, without a certificate of registration issued by this court."

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that her law firm corporation was not registered to practice law in Illinois, nor could, under law, open or maintain an establishment for that purpose in Illinois, as Gabe, Gabe & Associates, P.C. was not registered with the Illinois Supreme Court and could not practice law in the State of Illinois. [Exhibit D].

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 5.5(a).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that all proceedings since 1994 in which her law firm acted are void. Since all judgments in which a party who was not permitted by law to represent clients are, as a matter of law, void ab initio, all divorce judgments, among all other judgments, are void, the parties having not been issued a valid Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that all payments for legal services to her or her firm invoiced after 1994 were not for legal services, as neither she nor any other attorneys in her firm, could, under Illinois law, perform any legal services.

The Commission should order that all payments for purported legal services to Gabe, Gabe & Associates, P.C., Gabe, Gabe & Associates, or any attorney purportedly associated with the firm be returned to the parties who made such payments.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the invoices from her firm for purported legal services since 1994 were not for legal services, but were for the purpose of defrauding their clients.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm was willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violations of IRPC Rules 8.4(a)(4) and 8.4(a)(5).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and the other attorneys in her firm were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 705 ILCS 205/1, as they were prohibited by law to practice law in the State of Illinois, pursuant to SCR 721(c).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and other attorneys in her firm were engaged in barratry, 705 ILCS 215/26 and 720 ILCS 5/32-11, and maintenance, 705 ILCS 215/27 and 720 ILCS 5/32-12.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and the other attorneys in her firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 8.4(a)(3) and 8.4(a)(5).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were engaged in misrepresentation and fraud when they presented a judgment for fees for collection when the fee petition on which the judgment was based did not comply with the law.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were engaged as trespassers of the law, in attempting to enforce a void judgment. Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 8.4(a)(1), 8.4(a)(4), and 8.4(a)(5).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the invoices that her law firm served upon their clients did not comply with the law. David P. Pasulka, An Illinois Attorney's Guide to Fee Dispute Cases, Illinois Bar Journal, Vol. 84, December 1996, pg. 622. As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that even if a judge approved such invoices, they were against the law and the judge did not have statutory authority to approve unlawful invoices.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the judge in case no. 91-D-5122 was engaged in actions in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct and that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 8.3(b) and 8.4(a)(7) by not reporting said judge pursuant to the Rules.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm that the judge in case no. 91-D-5122 had no lawful authority to hear or rule in that case, as they had fraudulently concealed from the judge that they had obtained a void order, and that under Local Rule 90-D-2, the proper judge to hear or rule in the action was Judge Gustafson.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in violation of IRPC Rule 8.3(b).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that each attorney in a law firm is responsible for the acts of other attorneys in the same law firm.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she was engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 5.1(c)(2).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that neither she nor her law firm notified their then current clients and all new clients that she was under investigation for ethical misconduct by the Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission as held by court decisions.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that attorney(s) in Gabe, Gabe & Associates or in Gabe, Gabe & Associates, P.C. had filed a purported Petition for Dissolution of Marriage in case no. 91-D-5122, which was neither signed nor verified, as required by 750 ILCS 5/403.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that a Petition which is neither signed nor verified does not present a valid action to the Court, in violation of 735 ILCS 5/201.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that there was no legal basis to present any action to the Circuit Court of Cook County in case no. 91-D-5122.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that the Illinois Supreme Court had repeatedly held that a Petition that does not contain each and every fact necessary to bring a legal action before the court, does not give the court any jurisdiction. Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930). In spite of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction, as a matter of law, and having been advised that the Court had no jurisdiction, Gabe, Gabe & Associates willingly and intentionally continued to engage in attempting to enforce a void action.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were willingly and intentionally engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 8.4(a)(1), 8.4(a)(4), and 8.4(a)(5).

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm were engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 8.4(a)(1), 8.4(a)(2), 8.4(a)(3), 8.4(a)(4), 8.4(a)(5), 8.4(a)(7) in the above stated counts.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have a continuing duty to inform the court of the misrepresentations made to the court by another attorney, whether within or without their law firm.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have the duty to inform the 90-D-2724 court that an attorney of her firm appeared before Judge Gustafson on March 26, 1991 without proper notice to the Respondent and obtained a void order.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have the duty to inform the 90-D-2724 court that an attorney of her firm appeared before Judge Gustafson on March 26, 1991 under the name of an attorney from another law firm, misrepresenting to the 90-D-2724 that he was attorney Neil A. Robin, the attorney of record in the action before the Court.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have the duty to inform the 91-D-5122 court that Local Rule 90-D-2 was in effect and that the case should have been assigned to the same calendar judge to which the 90-D-2724 case had been assigned.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have the duty to inform the 91-D-5122 court that they had obtained a void order from the 90-D-2724 judge.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have a duty to inform the court that they have willingly and intentionally engaged in fraudulent concealment.

As an attorney, Caryl Jacobs Gabe knew, or reasonably should have known, that she and her law firm have willingly and intentionally been engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.4, 5.1, 5.5, 7.5, 8.3, and 8.4, Supreme Court Rule 712(c), and 705 ILCS 205/1, among other statutes.

I would appreciate your conducting an investigation into the above charges.

Yours truly,



Eugene Alpern




email:  clr@clr.org

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