January 26, 1998 The Honorable Timothy C. Evans Presiding Judge, Domestic Relations 1905 Richard J. Daley Center Chicago, IL 60602 Dear Judge Evans:I am writing to inform you of an unlawful scheme occurring in your Division.
This scheme involves a judge who has been abruptly transferred from the Domestic Relations Division, a judge who has engaged in a criminal act(s), a judge who has taken a $6,700. bribe, and judges who are covering up, aiding and abetting the unlawful actions of other judges, and involved in obstruction of justice.
Judicial immunity does not extend to a judge committing a criminal act, there is no immunity from the damages caused by a judge who has committed, or connived with another in, a criminal act, nor is there any immunity for a judge who is performing an administrative/ministerial act.
Some background:
On or about February 23, 1990, my wife, Phyllis, filed an action titled Phyllis Alpern v. Eugene Alpern, case no. 90-D-2724. Her attorney of record was Neil A. Robin of the Law Firm of Neil A. Robin. This case was assigned to Calendar C (Judge Gustafson).
During the month of September 1990, Phyllis employed attorney Allen S. Gabe, of Gabe, Gabe & Associates, to represent her. Neither Mr. Gabe nor the law firm of Gabe, Gabe & Associates filed an appearance in the 90-D-2724 action.
On March 26, 1991 Mr. Gabe, pretending to be Neil A. Robin, represented Phyllis before Judge Gustafson for a hearing on a purported Agreed Order for dismissal of the action. Such purported Order was heard without any notice to me (I did not have an attorney). According to the transcript of the case, Judge Gustafson correctly ruled that since I did not appear nor was there any evidence that I knew of the purported Agreed Order or agreed with the purported Agreed Order, or had been served with notice, he would not grant such an Order. However, the Clerk's microfilm shows that such an Agreed Order was purportedly signed by Judge Gustafson (I am presuming that the signature on the purported Agreed Order is that of Judge Gustafson, but it may not be his signature). Since Gustafson stated that he will not enter the purported Agreed Order for dismissal of the action, why was the purported Agreed Order for dismissal of the action entered contrary to his ruling?
Well established law has held that any Order issued without notice is void ab initio.
It is unlawful for any attorney to appear in court without filing an appearance or appearing in the name of an attorney from another law firm. Such appearance is a "fraud upon the court", and makes void the proceeding.
Even if the purported Agreed Order for dismissal was valid, an Order does not become final until 30 days have transpired. However, on April 4, 1991, only ten days later, attorney Gabe filed a second action under the title Phyllis Alpern v. Eugene Alpern, case no. 91-D-5122. This case was assigned to Calendar B (Judge Kaplan). Since the 90-D-2724 court still held subject-matter jurisdiction at that time, the 91-D-5122 court acquired no subject-matter jurisdiction.
While it was possible for the Petitioner to have exercised a one-time right to file a Motion for Substitution of Judge as of Right, the Petitioner did not. In the procedure followed by the Petitioner, if the second judge was not acceptable, they could have then advised the court of the double filing and have the second case assigned to the first assigned judge, i.e. Judge Gustafson. The Petitioner's attorney created a situation wherein he now had two judges assigned to the same action but different case numbers, and could then decide which judge he approved. This scheme is similar to the judge-shopping scheme used later in Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. George Allen Construction Co., cases nos. 94-CH-2465 (Braden), 94-CH-2466 (Braden), 94-CH-2467 (Jaffe), 94-CH-2468 (Ericsson), 94-CH-2470 (Jaffe), filed in Chancery in 1994 in an attempt to "pick" the judge of their choice. Judge-shopping under any form is unlawful.
At the time of the April 4, 1991 filing, Rule 90-D-2 of the Domestic Relations Division was in effect. This Rule was established by former Presiding Judge Mackoff to prevent the occurrence of judge-shopping in this Division. This Rule requires that a second action filed after a first action has been dismissed for any reason must be assigned to the first assigned judge.
In 1997 the First District Appellate Court held that Domestic Rule 90-D-2 is the law of this Circuit.
To cover up the unlawful acts stated above, the entire record of case no. 90-D-2724 has disappeared. To cover up the unlawful acts engaged in case no. 91-D-5122, a portion of the record of this case has disappeared.
The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that without a copy of the Complaint/Petition in the record of the case, a court is without subject-matter jurisdiction. In 1993, the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County stated in an affidavit that the 90-D-2724 record could not be found, and that a significant portion of the record of the 91-D-5122 trial court could not be found. A copy of the Petition was not a part of either record.
At the current time, Justices Hoffmann, O'Brien and Theis have stated that the record of the 91-D-5122 case does not contain a Petition. On December 8, 1997, Judge William Ward had the complete record of case no. 91-D-5122, as it currently exists, in his courtroom in 3006. Judge Ward admitted that he could not find a copy of the Petition of Dissolution of Marriage in the record of the case, and affirmed the findings of the three Justices and the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County. There is no proof that a valid Petition was ever filed in that case. Judge Ward suggested to the Petitioner's attorney that she contact the Petitioner and the Petitioner's prior attorney, Allen S. Gabe, to see if they could provide a file-stamped Petition. The Petitioner and attorney Allen S. Gabe was requested in 1992 to restore the record of the case. Judge Mackoff, in 1992, ordered the Clerk to restore the record of case no. 91-D-5122. At no time has the record of the case been restored. Even then, it can be presumed, that no Petition or no valid Petition was produced, as none existed.
Under Illinois law, when subject-matter jurisdiction is denied by the defendant/Respondent in a statutory proceeding, as in the 91-D-5122 case, the court is without subject-matter jurisdiction until and unless the Plaintiff/Petitioner has established that subject-matter jurisdiction had been lawfully conferred upon the court. Judge Ward had no subject-matter jurisdiction to issue any order except an order vacating the void judgment. The purported order issued on December 8, 1997 is void ab initio.
Illinois law also states that if subject-matter jurisdiction was attempted to be obtained through fraud, no subject-matter jurisdiction was acquired by the court. Filing multiple actions to obtain the judge of choice is a "fraud upon the court".
It has been my position since 1992 that the 91-D-5122 trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction at any time. However, your judges, in an attempt to protect a judge who acted without subject-matter jurisdiction, have delayed justice. Without subject-matter jurisdiction, I suggest that he engaged in acts of extortion, interference with interstate commerce, etc. And your other judges, who assist, aid, and abet him in covering up the unlawful acts, have themselves become principals in the criminal acts.
Recently Judge Gembela (96-CH-5651/91-D-5122) ruled that he did not have jurisdiction to vacate the void order, in direct contradiction to Illinois Supreme Court decisions. Judge Gembela failed to inform the court that his wife, Bettina, is in charge of the court records in the Clerk's office, and any finding for me due to the missing court records would involve his wife. Conflict of interest?? Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct??
Judges have a duty to vacate void orders. Under the Supreme Law of the Land, where judges have a duty, they do not have discretion and are not performing a judicial function. Having found no Petition in the record of the case, the current function before the court is an administrative function.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a criminal enterprise. Why are your judges proving that the ruling of the Seventh Circuit is correct?
In the past, the above types of actions by the judges were effectively kept covered up by the court. To prevent this from occurring in the above referenced actions, I have placed, and am placing all, documentation on the internet's World Wide Web for the world to see how justice is really handled in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Further, all orders issued by a judge who has accepted a bribe are null and void, of no legal effect or force.
The above is just a portion of the actions and the unlawful and criminal acts that have occurred in your Division to deprive me of my legal and Constitutional Rights. Your judges, the pleadings, and the court records, will substantiate the above facts and other claims that will be placed on the internet. None of the facts stated by me or my attorneys have ever been controverted.
Since there is no need to repeat citations of law, references to citations of law to the above can be found in the record of cases no. 91-D-5122, 96-CH-5651 and other cases filed to vacate the void judgment.
As the current situation before the court is an administrative matter, I hope that you will immediately review the entire acts that have incurred in cases 90-D-2724 and 91-D-5122 and all cases arising out of these two cases, and see that all null and void orders/judgments are immediately vacated.
Yours truly, Eugene Alpern cc: Internet bc:
Copyright© 1998 by Citizens for Legal Responsibility® . All rights reserved. email: clr@clr.org Return to Judge Evans' Page Return to Judges as Criminals Return to Home Page
February 26, 1998