August 7 1997 Ms. Mary Robinson, Administrator Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission 130 E. Randolph Dr. - #1500 Chicago, IL 60601-6219 Dear Ms. Robinson: Re: Theodora Gordon 8 S. Michigan Ave. - #2000 Chicago, IL 60603 312-346-8243These additional charges of attorney misconduct are being filed against attorney Theodora Gordon for the ethical violations stated below.
Attorney Theodora Gordon had admitted, in her response dated May 14, 1997, that she had acted in violation of the law, public policy of the State of Illinois, and her ethical duties. She had admitted that she had engaged in conduct that created a fraud upon the court. She further engaged in conduct of making misrepresentations to this Commission in an attempt to impede this Commission's investigation.
Apparently, attorney Gordon does not fully understand that the Supreme Court of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct ("IRPC") are Supreme Court Rules and is the law and the public policy of Illinois.
The Supreme Court, In re Eugene Lee Armentrout et al., 99 Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983), stated that:
"Fraud encompasses a broad range of human behavior, including " ' * * * anything calculated to deceive, * * * whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of mouth or by look or gesture.' " (Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858, citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Gilmore (1931), 345 Ill. 28, 46, 177 N.E. 710; In re Alschuler (1944), 388 Ill. 492, 503-04; Black's Law Dictionary 594 (5th ed. 1979).) Too, this court has previously disciplined lawyers even though their fraudulent misconduct did not harm [99 ILL2D 252] any particular individual. In re Lamberis (1982), 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549."In Frederick Edward Strufe, Disciplinary case no. 93 SH 100, the Supreme Court held that "Fraud has been broadly defined as anything calculated to deceive."
Our Supreme Court, in Steven R. Jakubowski, Disciplinary case no. 93 CH 455, stated that:
"The Court has broadly defined fraud as any conduct calculated to deceive, whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or silence, by word of mouth, by look, or by gesture. (In re Armentrout (1983) 99 Ill.2d 242, 457 N.E.2d 1262, 1266, 75 Ill. Dec. 703; In re Segall (1987) 117 Ill.2d 1, 509 N.E.2d 988, 991, 109 Ill. Dec. 149). Fraud includes the suppression of the truth, as well as the presentation of false information. (In re Witt (1991) 145 Ill.2d 380, 583 N.E.2d 526, 531, 164 Ill. Dec. 610)."Attorney Gordon, as an officer of the court, has a legal and fiduciary duty to the court not to commit fraud upon the court.
On July 18, 1997, a Notice of Demand was made upon Theodora Gordon to "return, no later than July 28, 1997, all monies charged by you and paid to you, relative to case no. 96-CH-5651." [Exhibit A].
As of this date, Gordon has not complied with the Notice of Demand. As an attorney, Theodora knew, or reasonably should have known, that she would be engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 1.15 if she did not comply with the provisions of that rule.
On July 21, 1997, Gordon sent a letter [Exhibit B] with a carbon copy to the ARDC. This letter is not a compliance with her requirements under IRPC Rule 1.15. Gordon was required to immediately deposit the disputed monies into a separate, accountable, and identifiable trust account, which she did not do. Instead, she deliberately and intentionally thumbed her nose at the Illinois Supreme Court's directive.
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that, by not placing the disputed monies in a separate and identifiable trust account, she was deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally engaged in an action in violation of IRPC Rule 1.15(c). She acted in reckless disregard of the Supreme Court's Rule.
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that, by not placing the disputed monies in a separate and identifiable trust account, she was deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally engaged in the conversion of monies that was in dispute into her own money, in violation of IRPC Rule 1.15.
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that, by not placing the disputed monies in a separate and identifiable trust account, she was deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally engaged in commingling monies that was in dispute with her own money, in violation of IRPC Rule 1.15.
In her July 21, 1997 letter to me and the ARDC, Gordon deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally falsely stated that she had "not engaged in any wrongful conduct." She had previously informed this Commission that she had engaged in actions contrary to previously cited law. The court had previously ruled that the reliance by an attorney on the attorney's client and not making a full and complete review of the facts, as required by law, is indicative of fraud upon the court. Edwards v. Estate of Harrison, 235 Ill.App.3d 213, 601 N.E.2d 862 (1st Dist. 1992).
Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known, that she had engaged in a fraud upon the court, and now was deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally making misrepresentations to the ARDC in an attempt to impede the Commission's investigation, in violation of IRPC Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.4(a)(1).
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that she was deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally engaged in violation of IRPC Rules 1.15, 3.3(a)(1), 3.3(a)(3), 3.3(a)(6), 8.4(a)(1), and 8.4(a)(4).
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that she had a legal and fiduciary duty to inform the trial court of any and all fraud perpetrated upon the trial court. Having made a full and complete inspection of the record of case no. 91-D-5122, as she had a duty to do, and was required to do under law, Gordon then had the legal and fiduciary duty to inform Judge Gembala in case no. 96-CH-5651 that the record of the 91-D-5122 case did not exist, or existed only in part, as she had, or reasonably should have, discovered on her inspection of the record of the case. In re Stern, 124 Ill.2d 310 (1988) ("failure to promptly reveal fraud upon a tribunal"). Gordon engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rule 3.3(a)(2), 3.3(a)(3), 3.3(a)(6), 3.3(a)(7), 8.3(a), 8.4(a)(1), 8.4(a)(2), 8.4(a)(4), 8.4(a)(5).
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that, she had a legal and fiduciary duty not to engage in "knowingly making a false statement of law or fact" to the court. In re Stern, 124 Ill.2d 310 (1988).
Gordon, before Judge Gembala, deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally made a false statement that I had accepted a $7500. check purported from case no. 93-B-7643. Upon calling Gordon about her false statement to the court, Gordon acted as if she had a record of the check purported accepted by me, a record that she could not find, since no check had been accepted by me. Gordon knowingly, deliberately, and intentionally engaged in a fraud upon the court, and engaged in an action in violation of IRPC Rules 3.3(a)(1), 4.1(a)(1), 4.1(a)(2) and 8.4(a)(1).
In making the false claim of my acceptance of a check, discussed above, Gordon was required by law to have previously made an inspection of case no. 93-B-7643 before making such an allegation. If she acted pursuant to law, as she had a duty to do, and was required by law to do, then during that required inspection Gordon would have discovered that attorneys Lawrence Fisher and Linda A. Greene had made a bribe to the involved judge in the value of $6700. or more. In her failure to report the bribe to the proper authorities, Gordon connived with, and became a principal to giving of the bribe to the judge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1. Gordon had a separate and independent duty to report the criminal activity of the two attorneys.
Gordon is involved in, and has aided and abetted, the bribery of a judge. In addition to engaging in the criminal activity associated with 18 U.S.C. 1, she is also involved, along with attorneys Lawrence Fisher and Linda A. Greene, in the criminal acts of 18 U.S.C. 152 and 18 U.S.C. 155.
In addition to her involvement in criminal activities, Gordon engaged in violation of IRPC Rules 8.4(a)(1), 8.4(a)(2), 8.4(a)(3), 8.4(a)(4), and 8.4(a)(5).
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that she deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally was engage in conduct which tends to defeat the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession into disrepute. Gordon engaged in actions in violation of IRPC Rules 771 and 8.4(a)(5).
In her July 21, 1997 letter, Gordon deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally stated that she has not engaged in any wrongful conduct. She deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally made a statement of material fact known to her to be false in connection with a disciplinary matter, in violation of IRPC Rules 3.3(a)(1) and 8.1(a)(1).
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that her engagement in actions of fraud upon the court, along with her misrepresentations to the court, and her other actions was in violation of IRPC Rule 8.4(a)(7).
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that her client did not comply with Circuit Court of Cook County Rule 13(a)(2), 735 ILCS 201, and 735 ILCS 601.
In her required inspection of the full and complete record of case no. 91-D-5122, a full and complete record which does not exist according to the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, and three Justices of the First District Appellate Court, she would have found that no legally valid Petition for Dissolution of Marriage was ever filed by the attorneys for her client. Subject-matter jurisdiction was never conferred on the Circuit Court of Cook County. She was, and is deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally defending a non-existent action, in violation of Rule 3.1.
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that she was deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly acting to violate the Supreme Court's directive in that "it is the duty of all lawyers to seek resolution of disputes at the least cost in time, expense and trauma to all parties and to the courts." Preamble to the Supreme Court of Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Gordon deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally engaged in actions to harass me and to force me to incur needless expense.
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that by her committing fraud upon the court, she deliberately, inten- tionally, and knowingly made the decision of that judge void and deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly placed the judge into a position of being in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, having his charges of judicial misconduct published, and his being charged in a complaint by the Judicial Inquiry Board for issuing a void judgement in violation of the law, acting in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and other ethical charges.
Gordon further engaged in actions in violation of Rule 8.4(a)(7).
As an attorney, Gordon knew, or reasonably should have known that her attempting to defend an action that is without subject-matter jurisdiction has placed her client in a position to be sanctioned, Pritzker v. Drake Tower Apartments, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 328 (1st Dist. 1996), and Gordon has deliberately, knowingly, and intentionally placed herself in a position of conflict of interest with her client, in violation of IRPC Rules 1.7 and 1.8.
Gordon deliberately, knowingly, flagrantly, and intentionally made repeated misrepresentations to the courts and to this Commission. She engaged in conduct that was unethical, unprofessional, and which tend to bring the legal and the judicial professions into disrepute. She engaged in conduct that was planned and designed to mislead the Courts and this Commission.
She has continually and repeatedly ignored Supreme Court directives - she apparently believes that she is above the law, and neither the Courts nor this Commission has any authority, as she has made repeated misrepresentations to both the Courts and this Commission.
She should further be ordered to return all monies she obtained from her client during her misrepresentations to the Court, wherein she placed her client into jeopardy.
Yours truly, Eugene Alpern
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