)
PHYLLIS ALPERN,                 )
                                )
               Petitioner,      )
                                )
          v.                    )  Case No. 91 D 5122
                                )
EUGENE ALPERN,                  )  Judge Veronica B. Mathein
                                )
               Respondent.      )
                                )

NOW COMES the Respondent, EUGENE ALPERN ("EUGENE") and moves this Court to reconsider its order of April 16, 1998 and for other relief.

1. On March 10, 1998 Theodora Gordon ("Gordon") appeared before Judge Mathein without any notice[fn1] to EUGENE and obtained a purported order setting a court hearing on April 16, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. Since EUGENE had not been given notice of the hearing, it is clear and well-settled law that all orders granted without notice are void. Wilson v. Moore, 13 Ill.App.3d 632, 301 N.E.2d 39 (1st Dist. 1973) ("an order entered on a motion without notice is void."); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863). At no time did EUGENE receive notice of the hearing nor a copy of any motion relative to what was to take place at the hearing.

Since the order was granted without any notice[fn1] to EUGENE, the order is void as a matter of law, and the Court's setting for the purported hearing on April 16, 1998 is also a void order.

EUGENE does not have any lawful duty to attend any hearing based on a secret[fn2] and ex-parte hearing, a hearing without notice[fn1], an unlawful hearing, and a hearing which is based on a void order.

2. At 1:15 p.m. on April 16, 1998 (just 45 minutes before the scheduled court time), Theodora Gordon filed her PETITIONER"S RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT"S MOTION DEMANDING PROOF OF THE SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. [Exhibit A, front page of Response showing date and time of filing]. This Response was not served upon EUGENE prior to, or during, the unlawful hearing. EUGENE did not receive a copy of the above Response until April 20, 1998, four(4) days after this Court heard the Petitioner's Response, and four(4)days after this Court issued an order based on the Petitioner's Response. EUGENE contends that the Court's considering the Petitioner's Response prior to its service upon EUGENE does not comply with legal requirements, Local Rule 2.1[fn1] et seq. of the Circuit Court of Cook County, and further violates EUGENE's due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The purported order of April 16, 1998 is void as a matter of law.

Since EUGENE was not lawfully served with the Response, this Court should vacate its order of April 16, 1998.

3. At no time since the PETITION TO VACATE VOID JUDGMENT UNDER 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(F) was filed has any written Appearance been filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court on behalf of PHYLLIS ALPERN ("PHYLLIS"). A Petition under 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) is a new and separate proceeding, and a written Appearance must be filed for this new and separate proceeding.

Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") 13(c)(1) states:
Addressing the Court. An attorney shall file his written appearance ... before he addresses the court " [Emphasis added].

Local Rule 1.4 of the Circuit Court Rules of Cook County states:

1.4(a) Addressing the court. An attorney shall file his appearance before he addresses the court ". [Emphasis added].

The Court, in Real Estate Buyer's Agents v. Foster, 234 Ill.App.3d 257, 600 N.E.2d 83, 85 (1992), stated that "although Supreme Court Rule 13(c)(1) requires that an attorney file a written appearance before addressing the court (134 Ill.2d R. 13(c)(1)), no such appearance was filed here." As in Real Estate, no appearance was ever filed in this cause.

The word "shall" is mandatory, not discretionary. Gordon cannot lawfully address this court. Only Gordon may file her appearance on behalf of PHYLLIS and only if PHYLLIS herself appoints Gordon to act as such. The Court has no authority to grant Gordon any permission to appear in violation of SCR 13(c)(1) or Local Rule 1.4(a). Agricultural Transp. Ass'n. v. Carpentier, 2 Ill.2d 19, 116 N.E.2d 863, 867 (1953).

EUGENE contends that all papers filed by Theodora Gordon were filed in violation of the law; are a legal nullity, and should be vacated/expunged/purged/dismissed. Under Illinois law, Theodora Gordon cannot represent PHYLLIS until after she has filed her written appearance on behalf of PHYLLIS and with PHYLLIS authorization.

Further, Gordon had no lawful right to address any of the judges relative to EUGENE's "PETITION FOR CHANGE OF JUDGE FOR CAUSE PURSUANT TO 735 ILCS 5/2-1001(a)(3), and all orders issued thereupon are void and should be vacated/dismissed/purged/ expunged. Without filing the required written Appearance, Gordon could not lawfully appear at any time on behalf of PHYLLIS or any party in this cause; Gordon had no standing to appear, and her pretentions of authority do not confer it; nor can the Court retroactively give her standing.

Gordon is NOT the attorney of record in this Petition hearing, and cannot lawfully appear before this court in this action. PHYLLIS is in default in this proceeding.

The Illinois Supreme Court has previously ruled that "A common maxim holds that ignorance of the law is no excuse, and this is particularly true in a case where the person who claims lack of knowledge of a relevant directive is a practicing attorney." In re Cheronis, 114 Ill.2d 527, 535 (1986). Gordon has shown an ignorance of the law, if not engaging in actions in a direct confrontation with the decisions of the Supreme Court.

4. Gordon should be sanctioned for her filing motions contrary to Supreme Court Rules ("SCR") and the Local Rules, for her appearing in Court without standing, for her appearing unlawfully before Judges Mathein, Evans, Jacobius, and Ponce DeLeon and placing these judges into a position of considering actions without lawful authority, of appearing in secret, ex-parte unlawful hearings, and placing these judges in an embarrassing and unlawful position.

5. Before issuing any order, this court is required to first determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. The Jennings Court ruled that "in a special statutory proceeding, an order MUST contain the jurisdictional FINDINGS prescribed by statute." [Emphasis added]. In re Jennings, 68 Ill.2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977). A court exercising a special statutory jurisdiction, the record must show upon its face that the case is one where the court has authority to act. Keal v. Rhydderck, 317 Ill. 231, 148 N.E.2d 53 (1925).

A divorce proceeding is a statutory proceeding, operates under special statutory jurisdiction, and is a court of limited jurisdiction. Before issuing any order the issuing judge must make an inspection of the record of the case to first determine if the judge has subject-matter jurisdiction. A valid order requires the making of explicit factual findings, not an allegation[fn3], that all of the jurisdictional findings prescribed by statute are found in the record of the case. The orders issued by Judge Mathein did not contain such findings, nor could they, as the record of the case did not support any such findings. Without making explicit factual findings in the Orders, Judge Mathein's Orders of March 10, 1998 and April 16, 1998 are not valid orders; however, since this Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction, the orders are void. Under the principle articulated by the Supreme Court in People v. B. & Q. R.R. Co., 231 Ill. 463 (1907), where they ruled that an invalid petition is no petition at all, this Courts' orders, which do not comply with law, are no orders at all.

The First District Appellate Court made an explicit finding that the record did not contain a Petition. (Rule 23 Order stated "Although petitioner's petition is not included in the record on appeal"). As the record on appeal and the record of the case were identical, that finding is determinative of the record of the case. The Justices' finding firmly established the fact that the 91-D-5122 trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction. In Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241 (1943) the court stated:

"A judgment void upon its face and requiring only an inspection of the record to demonstrate its invalidity is a mere nullity, in legal effect no judgment at all, conferring no right and affording no justification."

In Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930), the Court stated:

"The petition required to put the court in motion and give it jurisdiction must be in conformity with the statute granting the right and must show all the facts necessary to authorize it to act, -i.e., it must contain all the statements which the statute says the petition shall state, - and IF THE PETITION FAILS TO CONTAIN ALL OF THESE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS THE COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION." [Emphasis added]

The Appellate Court's findings of fact are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, Martin v. Martin, 170 Ill. 18, 48 N.E. 694 (1897), and upon this Court.

All orders issued which do not contain the explicit findings by this court that are prescribed by statute, are invalid. Jennings.

6. Apparently PHYLLIS does not understand the effect of a 1401(f) Petition. Under a 1401(f) Petition, EUGENE did not ask this Court to declare the August 10, 1992 judgment void. The Appellate Court's finding that there was no Petition in the record of the case had already firmly established the fact that the August 10, 1992 judgment was void, and nothing since has changed that fact. Under a 1401(f) Petition, EUGENE asked this Court to vacate/purge/expunge the void order in a proceeding which the Appellate Court stated a factual condition in which the statutory requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction did not exist. Since there is no Petition in the record of the case, this Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction. Brown v. VanKeuren, supra.

Under Jennings, Judge Mathein is required to inspect the record of the case prior to issuing an order, and report her findings in the order. This judge failed to inspect the record, she therefore could only lawfully accept the findings of the Appellate Court Justices and Judge Ward that no Petition existed in the record of the case. By issuing any order contrary to the findings of the Justices and Judge Ward, this judge challenged the findings of the other judges without submitting any proof that the four judges were incorrect. Judge Mathein must produce the valid Petition from the record of the case. Since a valid Petition did not ever exist, Judge Mathein can not produce such Petition. Judge Mathein's orders are not valid orders and cannot be made so by patchwork.

7. The essential elements of res judicata are (1) a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity of causes of action; and (3) an identity of parties or their privies. People ex rel. Burris v. Progressive Land Developers, Inc., 151 Ill.2d 285, 602 N.E.2d 820 (1992). A 1401(f) Petition is not a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. As to section (2) above, EUGENE is not asking this Court to grant him a divorce; EUGENE is asking this Court to comply with its duty to vacate a void judgment. Those causes of action are not identical.

As to section (1) above, the August 10, 1992 judgment is not final, has not been ruled upon on its merits, and was not rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction.

It is clear and well established law that subject- matter jurisdiction cannot be established by res judicata. The Court in People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 75 N.E.2d 851 (1947) stated that

"A judgment which is null and void may not be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata";

In Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill.2d 334, 16 N.E.2d 717 (1938) the court held that:

"It is a rule well established that a void judgment or order may be vacated at any time and the doctrines of laches and estoppel do not apply."

The purported Rule 23 Order from the First District Appellate Court is only res judicata towards another divorce action; it is not res judicata towards the new cause of action of expunging/vacating/purging a void order. Further PHYLLIS has the burden to provide evidence that the record of the 91-D-5122 case contains a valid Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, and that all of the other elements controlling subject-matter jurisdiction have been strictly complied with. PHYLLIS has not so complied. The 91-D-5122 trial court remains without subject-matter jurisdiction; the August 10, 1992 judgment remains void ab initio.

8. Even in any valid action to apply the doctrine of res judicata, one of the requirements is that there is an identity of causes of actions. In the underlying action, there is not an identity of causes of actions. The trial court action was an action for a dissolution of marriage; the current cause of action is an action to vacate a void judgment. Since the two actions are not identical, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. Rosenthiel v. Rosenthiel, 278 F.Supp. 794 (1967). The doctrine of res judicata would not apply in any instance where the three elements of res judicata have not been met; but especially would not apply in a void judgment which all courts have ruled is a prohibited action.

Further there must be a final judgment; void judgments are not final judgments.

9. Judge Mathein should know that under a 1401(f) Petition, the Respondent is not required to have a meritorious response. Mason v. Freeman Nat. Printing Equip. Co., 51 Ill.App.3d 581, 366 N.E.2d 1015 (1st Dist., 1977). Contrary to law, Judge Mathein dismissed the Petition to Vacate the void judgment of August 10, 1992 as being meritless. She has no subject-matter jurisdiction; in order to dismiss a Petition a judge is required to have subject-matter jurisdiction, and she can only established subject-matter jurisdiction through an inspection of the record, and a finding that the record of the case fully supports subject- matter jurisdiction.

Judge Mathein should know that in the 1401(f) proceeding she only has lawful authority to either vacate or not vacate the judgment, and only after she has made an independent inspection of the record of case no. 91-D-5122, or she can recite that she accepted the explicit findings of Justices O'Brien, Hoffmann, and Theis and Judge Ward that no Petition exists in the record of case no. 91-D-5122.

Further, since none of the other requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction have been met, an inspection of the record will establish that this Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction.

10. Judge Mathein has a history of holding multiple secret, ex-parte and unlawful hearings in this case from November 25, 1997 onward. EUGENE had not been served of the hearing that Judge Mathein held on November 25, 1997, and March 10, 1998. Not only was EUGENE not served, but the party who appeared before her is prohibited by the Illinois Supreme Court to practice law in the State of Illinois. EUGENE had terminated the services of James J. Reagan, P.C. ("Reagan") when EUGENE discovered that Reagan was prohibited to practice law in Illinois. Yet Judge Mathein allowed a party who is prohibited from the practice law in Illinois to appear before her in court. Judge Mathein assisted, connived with, aided and abetted, participated in, and covered up for Reagan in his unauthorized practice of law.

Reagan engaged in actions in violation of 720 ILCS 5/32-5. Judge Mathein assisted, connived with, and winked at Reagan's violation of the law. Based on the action of November 25, 1998, Judge Mathein acted as a principal in Reagan's violation of the law. 720 ILCS 5/32-5.

11. Judge Mathein further expressed her unjudicial conduct by her winking at Gordon in Gordon's appearing in court without filing a written appearance and without any standing to appear.

12. Rule 63(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "(1) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned".

EUGENE contends that a reasonable person who had access to the facts wherein Judge Mathein acted without authority, held multiple secret, ex-parte and unlawful hearings, assisted, connived with, aided and abetted, participated in, and covered up for (a) a party to unlawfully practice law, (b) Gordon with appearing in court without any standing, acting without subject- matter jurisdiction (the judge has never established that she had subject-matter jurisdiction, considering that four(4) other judges had made explicit findings that the record of the case contained no Petition). Judge Mathein violated the law by not disqualifying herself pursuant to rule.

13. If Judge Mathein knew the law and complied with it, as required by Rule 62(A) of the Code of Judicial Conduct[fn4], she should know that it is clear and well-established principle that res judicata does not apply to void orders. Yet she accepted the Petitioner's frivolous and false argument and applied it to the void orders before her court.

By her holding multiple secret, ex-parte hearings, and by her not ruling pursuant to well-established law, either Judge Mathein is showing her partiality, and is engaged in acting in violation of Rule 63(C) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or she is incompetent, and is engaged in acting in violation of Rule 62 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, or both. In either event, Judge Mathein has engaged in actions in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct; she has violated the law.

Whether or not Judge Mathein vacates the void judgment of August 10, 1998, there is no lawful way for her to make the void judgment valid. Bates v. Board of Education, Allendale Community Consolidated School District No. 17, 136 Ill.2d 260, 267 (1990) stated:

"it cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid.".

In The People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) the Supreme Court held:

"If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, it had no authority to make that finding."

The inspection of the record of case no. 91-D-5122 by four judges has made a final judgment that no Petition exists in the record; therefore pursuant to law, the purported judgment of August 10, 1992, based on a non-existent Petition, is void ab initio.

Although Courts have prohibited the application of res judicata to void orders[fn5], Judge Mathein accepted the argument of res judicata. Judge Mathein has placed herself above the judges of all higher courts in determining what the law is. EUGENE suggests that Judge Mathein is acting without lawful authority whenever she does so act.

Courts have repeatedly stated that subject-matter jurisdiction is determined only from an inspection of the record of a case[fn6]. Since all inspections of the record of case no. 91-D-5122 have found that no Petition is present, or probably ever was present, no summons served, etc., no subject-matter jurisdiction was ever conferred upon the Court.

14. In reviewing the Report of Proceedings of the purported April 16, 1998 hearing, scheduled at a secret, ex-parte, and unlawful hearing on March 10, 1998, EUGENE now adds the following: Judge Mathein was informed by Gordon and knew that EUGENE was a reporter for Citizens for Legal Responsibility, whose assignment, along with many other Citizens reporters, was to report on the incompetency and misconduct of judges, including Judges Mathein and Evans.

Knowing that EUGENE had published reports on Judge Mathein's incompetency and misconduct, Judge Mathein displayed her partiality against EUGENE by ruling without subject-matter jurisdiction, by her holding secret, ex-parte and unlawful hearings, by her conniving with, aiding and abetting, participating with, and covering up (a) for Reagan who is prohibited by the Illinois Supreme Court to practice law in Illinois, (b) for attorney Gordon for her appearing in court without having filed a written Appearance, (c) the unlawful conduct of other judges, (d) for judges who have taken bribes[fn7], (e) the unlawful acts of judge-shopping by Phyllis Alpern, Allen S. Gabe, Neil A. Robin, by her accepting a bribe from Gordon, since a bribe consists of the giving of anything worthwhile to a judge[fn7].

In an effort to punish EUGENE for properly exercising his legal, civil, and Constitutional Rights, Judge Mathein made a certain purported order on April 16, 1998, which only further proves EUGENE's contention that Judge Mathein either is incompetent, in violation of SCR Rule 62(A) and Rule 63(A), and does not know the law, or she is not impartial, in violation of Rule 63(C), or both. Either way, Judge Mathein has proven that she has engaged in actions in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Judge Mathein acted to restrict EUGENE's Constitutional Right to petition the court for redress under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and as applied to her court through the Fourteenth Amendment,and the Illinois Constitution. Her Orders are void ab initio. Judge Mathein issued an order in which she engaged in actions in violation of Jennings, which made the order invalid.

Should any judge attempt to restrict EUGENE's access to the Courts, or to restrict any other person from lawfully accessing the Courts, then I will join the many other reporters from Citizens in educating the public on the unlawfulness of the judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County through the media and the internet. Citizens' members will either access the Courts through normal filing of legal documents through the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, or they will file these documents through the internet. Which would the Court prefer?

The U.S. Government, in United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985), held that the criminal enterprise "was the Circuit Court of Cook County". Judge Murphy was convicted of criminal RICO. The criminal actions by the judges of the Circuit Court of Cook County have continued, in their acceptance of bribes, in their engaging in actions in interference of interstate commerce, in their cheating the people of Illinois from having a honest judiciary, and in their taking of money collected through taxation for payment of salaries, and other benefits, and in the judges not performing the duties that the Constitution requires of them.

Even if the 91-D-5122 trial court held subject-matter jurisdiction, which there is no evidence that it ever held such jurisdiction, this court does not hold subject-matter jurisdiction. In a statutory proceeding, after 30 days from judgment, there can be no reinvestment of subject-matter jurisdiction. This Court only operates under the inherent power of a Court to expunge/vacate/purge void orders. Without subject- matter jurisdiction, this Court cannot dismiss a Petition - to dismiss a Petition the Court must have subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court only has the lawful power to either vacate the void judgment of August 10, 1992 or not to vacate. It has no other lawful powers.

In February, the First District appellate court, adopted the previous holdings from the U.S. Supreme Court, in their holding in Otakar Kirchner, Daniel Kirchner v. Bob Greene, Chicago Tribune Company, and Chicago Tribune Newspapers, Inc., 1- 96-3497, sl.op. (1st Dist. February 9, 1998)

"While no member of the judiciary enjoys hearing the kind of epitaph used here, in a free society public officials learn to accept such criticism in the same manner as they enjoy the occasional praise of their official actions --- it just goes with the territory."

Citizens' members, as well as EUGENE, have a lawful right to criticize the judges for their actions. However, Judge Mathein, in attempting to restrict EUGENE's right to access the Court has done so in violation of his Constitutional rights to access the courts and the availability of the rule of law.

This Court's attempt to restrict EUGENE's access to the courts will not make the void judgment of August 10, 1992 valid. It will only move the issue to other courts, to the media, and to the internet. I submit it will not have the effect this Court wishes, but will only bring the courts into disrepute.

WHEREFORE, EUGENE prays that this Court will reconsider it's purported Order of April 16, 1998 and

A. will vacate it,

B. will rule on the 1401(f) Petition before it,

C. will vacate the August 10, 1992 judgment, and

D. will enter sanctions against Theodora Gordon.

                                   Respectfully submitted,

                                   _____________________________
                                   Eugene Alpern

Eugene Alpern
P.O. Box 672
Morton Grove, IL 60053-0672

fn1: Local Rule 2.1(c)(1) of the Cook County Circuit Court Rules states:
Notice shall be given in the manner and to the persons described in Supreme Court Rule 11. If notice of hearing is given by personal service, the notice shall be delivered before 4 p.m. of the second (2nd) court day preceding the hearing of the motion. If notice is given by mail, the notice shall be deposited in a United States Post Office or Post Office Box on or before the fifth (5th) court day preceding the hearing of the motion.

The essential elements of due process of law are notice and an opportunity to be heard in an orderly proceeding. Chicago Land Clearance Commission v. Darrow, 12 Ill.2d 365, 146 N.E.2d 1 (1957)

fn2: Black's Law Dictionary defines secret as "particularly, in law, kept from the knowledge or notice of persons liable to be affected by the act ... ".

fn3: "a trial court's express finding that it has jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction." Lombard v. Elmore, 134 Ill.App.3d 898, 480 N.E.2d 1329 (1st Dist. 1985); "Neither does the court acquire jurisdiction by a mere recital in an order, which is contrary to what is shown in the record." Hill v. Daley, 28 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 328 N.E.2d 142 (1st Dist. 1975)

fn4: The Code of Judicial Conduct is a Supreme Court Rule, and as with all other Supreme Court Rules, the Rules have the force of law and represent the public policy of the State of Illinois. Judges are required, as well as all other parties, to obey the law.

fn5: People v. Kidd, 398 Ill. 405, 75 N.E.2d 851 (1947) ("A judgment which is null and void may not be used as a basis for the application of the doctrine of res judicata"); Ottwell v. Ottwell, 167 Ill.App.3d 901, 522 N.E.2d 328 (5th Dist. 1988); In re Marriage of Allcock, 107 Ill.App.2d 150, 437 N.E.2d 392 (1982); Lytton v. Cole, 54 Ill.App.2d 161, 203 N.E.2d 590 (1st Dist. 1964); First National Bank and Trust Co. v. Village of Skokie, 190 F.2d 791 (C.A. 7th), cert den., 342 U.S. 909, 72 S.Ct. 303.

fn6: Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241 (1943); State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill.2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986); Keal v. Rhydderich, 317 Ill. 231 (1925); Wabash Area Development, Inc. v. Ind. Com., 88 Ill.2d 392 (1981); People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer, 36 Ill.2d 438, 223 N.E.2d 128 (1967); In re Cash, 383 Ill. 409, 429 (1943).

fn.7: Bribe (Black's Law Dictionary - 6th Edition) is defined as:
"Any money, goods, right in action, property, thing of value, or any preferment, advantage, privilege or emolument, or any promise or undertaking to give any, asked, given or accepted, with a corrupt intent to induce or influence action, vote, or opinion of person in any public or official capacity. A gift, not necessarily of pecuniary value, bestowed to influence the conduct of the receiver."

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May 18, 1998