First District Appellate Court

On July 17, 1998 the following complaint was filed with the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board.

NOTE: Either Justice Sheila M. O'Brien was incompetent, did not know the law, or she had accepted a bribe to rule contrary to law. Read the following complaint, and send us your comments. Thanks, Editor

July 17, 1998



State of Illinois
Judicial Inquiry Board
100 W. Randolph St. - #14-500
Chicago, IL 60601

I am presenting information of willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform her duties, and other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice and that brings both her judicial office and the entire Illinois judiciary into public disrepute on the part of Sheila M. O'Brien of the First District Appellate Court. A Justice should strive to maintain confidence in our judicial system (Preamble to Code of Judicial Conduct), but Justice O'Brien's actions destroy confidence in the judicial system. Unless she is severely disciplined or removed from office, she will continue to violate the Code of Judicial Conduct and violate the laws of the State of Illinois and of the U.S. Government.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she had conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, in violation of her duty under the law, in a "fraud upon the court", in treasonable acts, and in acts which aid and abet others in engaging in criminal activity, thus making herself a principal in the criminal activity.

The entire records of trial court case no. 91-D-5122 (Cook County) and Appellate Court case no. 1-92-2975 are incorporated into this charge of judicial misconduct.

Judge Sheila O'Brien is a Justice who purportedly was assigned to hear and rule in Appellate case no. 1-92-2905 (consolidated with 1-92-2975, 1-93-040, and 1-93-0601). Justice O'Brien, along with two other Justices, inspected the entire record of trial case no. 91-D-5122 (the Appellate Court had ordered the entire record of trial case no. 91-D-5122 to be certified and sent to the Appellate Court, in spite of the fact that the Clerk of the Circuit Court requested additional time to restore the record); therefore the entire record of trial case no. 91-D-5122 and the record of the trial case no. 91-D-5122 presented to the Appellate Court for review are identical.

Justice O'Brien, along with the two other Justices of the Appellate Court found and reported that the record of trial case no. 91-D-5122 did not contain a Petition/Complaint for Dissolution of Marriage. The sham Rule 23 Order signed by Justice O'Brien stated "Although petitioner's petition is not included in the record on appeal, ". As a judge, Justice O'Brien knew that without a valid Petition in the record of the case, no subject-matter jurisdiction was conferred upon the 91-D-5122 trial court, Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930) ("The petition required to put the court in motion and give it jurisdiction MUST be in conformity with the statute granting the right and MUST SHOW all the facts necessary to authorize it to act, -i.e., it must contain all the statements which the statute says the petition shall state, - and if the petition fails to contain all of these essential elements the court is without jurisdiction.") [Emphasis added]. This principle also applies to the Appellate Court. She also knew that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement or by acquiescence, City of Chicago v. Shayne, 27 Ill.2d 414, 189 N.E.2d 324 (1963); Klopfer v. Court of Claims, 286 Ill.App.3d 499, 676 N.E.2d 679 (1st Dist. 1987) ("the parties to an action cannot confer jurisdiction by their acquiescence or consent"), but subject-matter jurisdiction must be found by an inspection of the record. State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill.2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986); Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241 (1943) ("A judgment void upon its face and requiring only an inspection of the record to demonstrate its invalidity is a mere nullity, in legal effect no judgment at all, conferring no right and affording no justification."). The judgment of both the 91-D-5122 court and the Appellate Court was a nullity. Justice O'Brien did not comply with the law; Justice O'Brien engaged in conduct in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 62(A) and Supreme Court Rule ("SCR") 62(A). [fn1] Justice O'Brien engaged in conduct in violation of the law of the State of Illinois.

If Justice O'Brien knew the law, she would know that all orders/ judgments issued without subject-matter jurisdiction have no legal force or effect. She would also know that a void order is not a final order. And she would know that the Appellate Court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and rule on an appeal of any trial court order unless it was a final order (except for an interlocutory order, which was not the situation in Appellate case no. 1-92-2905).

Justice O'Brien did not know the law, she demonstrated her lack of knowledge of the law, and she did not comply with the law, in violation of Code of Judicial Conduct 62(A), a Supreme Court Rule and therefore the law of the State of Illinois, or she intentionally engaged in actions in violation of the law. Justice O'Brien engaged in unethical and unlawful actions.

Since there was no Petition in the record of the case, and a valid Petition was probably never filed in the 91-D-5122 action, Justice O'Brien proceeded in Appellate Court without subject-matter jurisdiction. Without a Petition in the record of the case, Justice O'Brien acted without subject- matter jurisdiction and engaged in actions in violation of the law. The issuance of any order except for an order vacating the void judgment of the 91-D-5122 trial court was in violation of all laws. Marriage of Arrington, 146 Ill.App.3d 121, 497 N.E.2d 117 (1st District, 1986) ("It is axiomatic that when a trial court has no jurisdiction, an appeal cannot act to confer jurisdiction on the reviewing court. In re Estate of Randell, (1973), 12 Ill.App.3d 640, 298 N.E.2d 735.").

Based on the face of the record, the 91-D-5122 trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, and all orders and judgments of that court were void. Justice O'Brien had no subject-matter jurisdiction to issue any ruling except for an order vacating the 91-D-5122 void orders and judgment.

The Illinois Supreme Court issued the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct as Supreme Court Rules ("SCR"). The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct is incorporated herein as a part of this Complaint. Supreme Court Rules are the law [fn1], and must be followed by litigants, attorneys, and all Circuit judges and Appellate Court Justices. Compliance with SCR is not discretionary, but is mandatory [fn1]. Any noncompliance is unlawful, and Justices have no lawful authority to act unlawfully. The failure of any judge to comply with statutes and the law deprives the judge of subject- matter jurisdiction. Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921).

The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 62(A) states:

A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself or herself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 63(A) states:

(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities

(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it.

Justice Sheila O'Brien knew, or should have known, that every court of lawful jurisdiction has not only the inherent power, but the duty, Klopfer v. Court of Claims, supra, to determine subject-matter jurisdiction before she hears or rules in any action. Inherent power of a court is not dependent on whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction, otherwise it could never have the lawful authority to determine if it had subject-matter jurisdiction in any matter before it. This inherent power to determine subject-matter jurisdiction applies not only to determine its own subject- matter jurisdiction, but the subject-matter jurisdiction of any other court. People v. Childs, 278 Ill.App.3d 65, 663 N.E.2d 161 (4th Dist. 1996) ("The duty to vacate a void judgment is based on the inherent power of a court to expunge from its records void acts of which it has knowledge."); Evans v. Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990) ("A court has inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records.").

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that under the Supreme Law of the Land:

"Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law, and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law." [Emphasis in original]. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 412 (7th Cir. 1972), citing Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat (22 U.S.) 738, 866, 6 L.Ed 204 (1824); U.S. v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that the void judgment brought before her, remains void even if she did not vacate it. Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that the void judgment was not affirmed nor validated by her failure to properly exercise her judicial duty.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she had the duty, and had no discretion, to vacate all void orders and judgments. Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she had conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of her duty as a Justice, and engaged in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, and the Law of the State of Illinois. Obucino, supra.

All Justices have taken an oath to, and their lawful authority depends on their complete and full compliance with, the Constitution of the United States of America, and the Supreme Law of the Land.

The Supreme of the Land can be found in the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In Old Wayne Mut. L. Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907), the Supreme Court ruled that:

"Chief Justice Marshall had long before observed in Ross v. Himely, 4 Cranch 241, 269, 2 L.ed. 608, 617, that, upon principle, the operation of every judgment must depend on the power of the court to render that judgment. In Williamson v. Berry, 8 How. 495, 540, 12 L.ed. 1170, 1189, it was said to be well settled that the jurisdiction of ANY COURT exercising authority over a subject `may be inquired into in EVERY OTHER COURT when the proceedings in the former are relied upon and brought before the latter by a party claiming the benefit of such proceedings,' and the rule prevails whether `the decree or judgment has been given, in a court of admiralty, chancery, ecclesiastical court, or court of common law, or whether the point ruled has arisen under the laws of nations, the practice in chancery, or the municipal laws of states.'" [Emphasis added].

In Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828), the court stated that:

"without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers. This distinction runs through all the cases on the subject; and it proves, that the jurisdiction of ANY COURT exercising authority over a subject, may be inquired into IN EVERY COURT, when the proceedings of the former are relied on and brought before the latter, by the party claiming the benefit of such proceedings." [Emphasis added].

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, the law and the U.S. Supreme Court decisions that ANY COURT and EVERY COURT can vacate a void order. Justice O'Brien conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land, and of Rule 62(A) and Rule 63(A), she engaged in acts in violation of Illinois law and she lost subject-matter jurisdiction.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, the Illinois Supreme Court decisions that ANY COURT can, and has a duty to, vacate a void order.

Contrary to Justice O'Brien's acts, and considering that the writer is a non-lawyer, he found many Illinois Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions that grant all Justices lawful authority to vacate the 91-D-5122 judgment before them. As only a few of the many Illinois citations, the following are presented:

In City of Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices Com., 65 Ill.2d 108, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976), the court stated that "A judgment, order or decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, is void, and may be attacked at any time or in ANY COURT, either directly or collaterally." [Emphasis added].

In R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill.2d 304, 309, 489 N.E.2d 1360 (1986), the court stated that "[a] judgment, order or decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, is void, and may be attacked at any time or IN ANY COURT, either directly or collaterally." [Emphasis added].

In Evans v. Corporate Services, 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 565 N.E.2d 724 (2nd Dist. 1990) the court stated that "a void judgment, order or decree may be attacked at any time or in ANY COURT, either directly or collaterally" [Emphasis added].

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that the phrases "ANY COURT", "IN ANY COURT", "IN EVERY COURT" and "EVERY OTHER COURT" found in Court decisions means any court in Cook County, any court in the State of Illinois, or in any court, state or federal, in the United States, as a void order has no legal force or effect, and is not, and could not be, at any time, a final judgment.

In People v. Streeper, 12 Ill.2d 204, 145 N.E.2d 625 (1957), the Court stated that "The jurisdiction of the court must be determined as of the commencement of the action. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565".

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she had to determine the question of subject-matter jurisdiction at the commencement of both the 90-D-2724 action in 1990 and the 91-D-5122 action in 1991. Justice O'Brien did not comply with the law, and did not determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Cook County existed at either pertinent time.

Justice O'Brien conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct in violation of Rule 62(A) and Rule 63(A), and she brought the Illinois judiciary into public disrepute.

"Fraud upon the court" occurs whenever any officer of the court commits fraud before a tribunal. A Justice is not a court; a Justice is under law an officer of the court, and a Justice must not engage in any action to deceive the court. Trans Aero Inc. v. LaFuerga Area Boliviana, 24 F.3d 457 (2nd Cir. 1994); Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985) (fraud upon the court exists "where the judge has not performed her judicial duties"). Justice O'Brien has not performed her judicial duties to vacate void orders.

Our Supreme Court, In re Eugene Lee Armentrout et al., 99 Ill.2d 242, 75 Ill.Dec. 703, 457 N.E.2d 1262 (1983), stated that:

"Fraud encompasses a broad range of human behavior, including " ' * * * anything calculated to deceive, * * * whether it be by direct falsehood or by innuendo, by speech or by silence, by word of mouth or by look or gesture.' " (Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 419, 435, 12 Ill.Dec. 151, 369 N.E.2d 858, citing People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Gilmore (1931), 345 Ill. 28, 46, 177 N.E. 710; In re Alschuler (1944), 388 Ill. 492, 503-04; Black's Law Dictionary 594 (5th ed. 1979).) Too, this court has previously disciplined lawyers even though their fraudulent misconduct did not harm [99 Ill.2d 252] any particular individual. In re Lamberis (1982), 93 Ill.2d 222, 229, 66 Ill.Dec. 623, 443 N.E.2d 549.

The decision by Justice O'Brien in stating that the 91-D-5122 trial court held subject-matter jurisdiction when she found that the record of the 91-D-5122 trial court evidenced the lack of a Petition, was a statement made to deceive the parties before the court, was contrary to known law, and was a fraud upon the court by Justice O'Brien, was a demonstration of her lack of competency, in violation of Rule 63(A), or was a demonstration of her failure to respect and comply with the law, in violation of Rule 62(A), or both. Justices should not engage in a fraud upon the court, issuing decisions that she knew, or should have known, under law were void, were contrary to law, and in violation of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct.

Justice O'Brien has no lawful authority to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on any court that does not have subject-matter jurisdiction, yet Justice O'Brien has attempted to confer subject-matter jurisdiction on both the Circuit Court and the First District Appellate Court upon which no subject-matter jurisdiction was ever conferred by law, Martin v. Schillo, 389 Ill. 607, 60 N.E.2d 392 (1945) ("Jurisdiction of the subject matter is always conferred by law."), and only by law.

The law in Illinois is stated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois. Before the Appellate Court could rule on the Appeal, it first had to determine if the lower court held subject-matter jurisdiction. After its finding that there was no Petition in the record of the 91-D-5122 case, according to the prior decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court, as cited below, the only valid decision that Justice O'Brien could make was that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Since the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction, the Appellate Court held no subject-matter jurisdiction and any ruling, other than an order to vacate the trial court's orders was issued without subject-matter jurisdiction, and was itself void. The Appellate Court's purported finding that the trial court held jurisdiction as to a cause of action was void ab initio since it's prior findings that there was no Petition in the record of the case deprived that court of any subject-matter jurisdiction to issue any order except an order to vacate the trial court's void judgment. Justice O'Brien engaged in unlawful acts.

The Appellate Court was bound by the following Supreme Court decisions. In In re Contest of Elections for Governor, 93 Ill.2d 465 (1983), the court stated:

"The petition required to put the court in motion and give it jurisdiction must be in conformity with the statute granting the right and must contain all the statements which the statute says the petition shall state, - and if the petition fails to contain all of these essential elements the court is without jurisdiction. citing Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118 (1930)." [Emphasis added].

"The court derived its jurisdiction to proceed in a matter solely from statute, ordinary presumptions of jurisdiction do not obtain, and every fact necessary to support such jurisdiction must appear from the face of the record." People v. Heizer, 36 Ill.2d 438, 223 N.E.2d 128 (1967) [Emphasis added.]

The trial court in case 91-D-5122 lacked authority to act for want of subject matter jurisdiction. People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) ("If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, -- it had no authority to make that finding.").

In I.C.R.R. Co. v. Hasenwinkle, 232 Ill. 224, 227 (1908), the court stated that "The law presumes nothing in favor of the jurisdiction of a court exercising special statutory powers, such as those given by statute under which the court acted, (Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Galt, 133 Ill. 657), and the record must affirmatively show the facts necessary to give jurisdiction. The record must show that the statute was complied with".

Justice O'Brein knew, or should have known, that in all courts of limited jurisdiction, such as domestic relations, there is no presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction, People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill.2d 77, 84 (1983); People v. Heizer, 36 Ill.2d 438 (1967), and that subject-matter jurisdiction can only be determined by an inspection of the full and complete record of the case. State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill.2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986); Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241 (1943); Wabash Area Development, Inc. v. Ind. Com., 88 Ill.2d 392 (1981). Contrary to law, Justice O'Brien presumed subject-matter jurisdiction to have been conferred even though she inspected the full and complete record of the 91-D-5122 action and found that no Petition existed within the record of the case.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known that she and two other Appellate Court Justices, and the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County inspected the full and complete record of the case [fn2], and all four found that no Petition existed in the record of the case. Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known that, under Illinois law, Herb v. Pitcairn, 384 Ill. 237, 241 (1943) ("A judgment void upon its face and requiring only an inspection of the record to demonstrate its invalidity is a mere nullity, in legal effect no judgment at all, conferring no right and affording no justification."), the inspection by the four parties substantiated that the record of the 91-D-5122 action could not sustain a valid judgment. This finding has never been controverted, and Justice O'Brien had no lawful authority to issue any ruling in violation of the law. Justice O'Brien acted without subject-matter jurisdiction, and as stated below, engaged in unlawful and treasonable acts.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she and the Appellate Court acted without lawful authority and she knew, or should have known, that she could not utilize a void order, an order issued without subject- matter jurisdiction, in her decision.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, the law relative to void orders. Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known that under the law in Illinois she was a trespasser of the law. Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870) ("if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers."); Elliott v. Peirsol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828).

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she had no lawful authority to act directly or indirectly in such a manner that allowed a judgment to stand when the judge issuing that judgment had no subject-matter jurisdiction. She knew, or should have known, that she was conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly engaged in conduct supporting a void judgment in violation of the law, and she engaged in an action in violation of the law.

Justice O'Brien engaged, along with two other Justices, in acts as a trespasser of the law. Should anyone now or in the future assist Justice O'Brien in acting as a trespasser, then that party also becomes a trespasser of the law.

Justice O'Brien knew, or reasonably should have known that no reviewing courts have any lawful authority to affirm or validate void judgments or orders. knew, or reasonably should have known that the Illinois Supreme Court had no lawful authority to review or affirm the void Order of the Illinois Appellate Court. The Supreme Court acted correctly when it refused to hear the appeal of the Appellate Court, as it knew that it had no lawful authority to review an Appellate Court's void order.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she not only had the duty to, but also had the lawful authority to vacate the void judgment of the 91-D-5122 action and the void judgment of the First District Appellate Court sua sponte on her own motion. People v. Thompson, 231 N.E.2d 605 (1967).

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known that void orders have no legal force or effect. Yet Justice O'Brien engaged in conduct that attempted to made a void judgment valid, contrary to any and all known law. Bates v. Board of Education, Allendale Community Consolidated School District No. 17, 136 Ill.2d 260, 267 (1990) ("it cannot confer jurisdiction where none existed and cannot make a void proceeding valid. See People ex rel. Gowdy v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. (1943), 385 Ill. 86, 92, 52 N.E.2d 255.").

Based on the Appellate's Brief filed with the Appellate Court and the record of case nos. 90-D-2724 and 91-D-5122, Justice O'Brien knew, or reasonably should have known, that the unlawful act of "judge-shopping" had occurred in the procurement of purported subject-matter jurisdiction in case no. 91-D-5122. This fraud vitiated the lawful authority of the 91-D-5122 judge. By Justice O'Brien's failure to rule that the filing of identical actions before the Circuit Court of Cook County was unlawful, she participate in, and connived with the parties in, an unlawful scheme of judge-shopping.

Justice O'Brien knew, or reasonably should have known, that she was engaged in the waste of judicial resources. The Respondent suggests that Justice O'Brien's engagement in the waste of judicial resources is a fraud upon the State of Illinois and a fraud upon the taxpayers of the State of Illinois.

Justice O'Brien knew that the marriage tax penalty applies to all married couples. Since married people pay a higher rate of income tax than single divorced people, less monies are paid to the government for income tax. By her ruling in 1-92-2905, Justice O'Brien deprived the State of Illinois of income taxable revenue, deprive the Internal Revenue Service of their proper income taxable revenue, and assisted and abetted a criminal act of false filing as to income taxes.

Since in the case at bar, no legal divorce was granted, Justice O'Brian participate with the Petitioner in a scheme to defraud the government of their proper taxable income.

Justice O'Brien knew, or reasonably should have known that by her delaying to vacate the void order, any execution on the void order could lead to a criminal act being performed by others, based on the void order, and that no judge should aid and abet criminal actions. Justice O'Brien knew, or reasonably should have known that, should anyone execute on the void order and if such execution should interfere with interstate commerce, such as interfering with the Respondent's purchase of any items involved in interstate commerce, United States v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985), then Justice O'Brien would become a principal, 18 U.S.C. $1, in the interference with interstate commerce. Since EUGENE'S lawful rights in interstate commerce were interfered with, Justice Sheila O'Brien has made herself a principal actor in the Federal crime of interfering with interstate commerce. Both Justice O'Brien and Judge Murphy, Murphy, supra, have engaged in the Federal crime of interference with interstate commerce.

Extortion is defined in Black's Law Dictionary - 6th Edition as:
"The obtaining of property from another induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right."

Should anyone attempt to execute on the void judgment that Justice O'Brien had, under her judicial responsibility, a duty to vacate, then she would have personally aided and abetted a scheme of extortion and other criminal activity. Justice O'Brien would then be involved in the unlawful act of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. $1951. As an attempt is currently being made to take property under color of official right, Justice O'Brien is involved in extortion.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that under the Illinois Constitution, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County had the duty to preserve the full and complete records of all cases. Based on the affidavits of the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Justice O'Brien knew that the full and complete records of cases no. 90-D-2724 and 91-D-5122 were not preserved.

Justice O'Brien knew, or should have known, that she engaged in, and connived in, actions to support the Clerk of the Circuit Court in the Clerk's violation of the Clerk's Constitutional and statutory duties to preserve the records of cases no. 90-D-2724 and 91-D-5122.

When a judge does not comply with the law, he/she is not acting as a judge under the law. He/she does not hold any office for the State of Illinois because he/she has failed to meet the federal statutory prerequisites that would support the Constitutional mandate that all judges shall be bound thereby pursuant to Article VI of the Constitution of the United States:

"This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."

And pursuant to Title 4 U.S.C. 101 notwithstanding any conflicting Illinois state statutes as stated:

101. Oath by members of legislatures and officers

"Every member of a State legislature, and every executive and judicial officer of a State, shall, before he proceeds to execute the duties of his office, take an oath in the following form, to wit: `I, A.B., do solemnly swear that I will support the Constitution of the United States."
(July 30, 1947, ch. 389, 61 Stat. 643.)

The Constitution of the United States of America represents the United States Government.

Whenever a judge acts and deprives any person of any of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, that judge had declared war against the Constitution. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958) ("No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.").

Since the Constitution represents the government, Justice O'Brien has also declared war against the United States of America.

The United States Supreme Court has held that "Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights of parties shall have jurisdiction.". Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 24 (1908), citing Old Wayne Mut. Life Assoc. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 S.Ct. 236 (1907); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 14 S.Ct. 1108 (1894); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).

As due process is a constitutional right, any judge who acts without, or in excess of, subject-matter jurisdiction has engaged in an act in violation of the United States Constitution and has declared war against the United States of America.

Judges have no right to usurp jurisdiction when it is not given to them. Should a judge usurp jurisdiction, it would be treason to the Constitution. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821).

All judges in a statutory proceeding are presumed under law not to have subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction can only be determined by an inspection of the record.

If a judge should hear and consider any cause for which the court does not hold subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge would be acting in treason to the Constitution, and since the Constitution represents the United States of America, the judge would be acting in treason to the United States government.

Justice O'Brien engaged in an act of treason, and has attacked the United States Government.

In case no. 91-D-5122, four judges (Justices O'Brien, Theis, and Hoffman, and Judge William Ward) have inspected the record of the case and have reported that they found that the record of the case does not contain a Petition (Complaint). Judges Timothy Evans, Philip S. Lieb, Francis Gembela, and Veronica B. Mathein must accept the findings of the four judges, as they have a duty to either inspect the record of the case or to accept the findings of the four judges. No judge has found that there is a Petition in the record of case no. 91-D-5122.

The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that, in all statutory proceedings, the record of the case must contain a valid Petition (Complaint), or else the court is without subject-matter jurisdiction. Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930).

American men and women have died, or have become physically or mentally damaged, or both, to support the U.S. Government and its Constitution. These American men and women, who have died, must be turning over in their graves when they see Justice O'Brien declaring war against the Constitution. They died to support the Constitution; Justice O'Brien is being paid by the State of Illinois to war against the Constitution. Justice O'Brien has made a mockery of the sacrifices made by the many honorable men and women who fought for the United States.

One wonders what would the men who died in protecting this Government, if they could, and their families would suggest to be done to judges who war against the Constitution and the United States of America? One wonders what do men who were physically or mentally harmed in protecting this Government, or their families, suggest to be done to judges who war against the Constitution and the United States of America?

The Constitutional freedoms were paid for with the lives of many; these Constitutional freedoms were not meant to be stomped upon by judges who are ignorant of the law, do not follow the law, do not comply with the law, and who attack the Constitution of the United States by denying any member of the public their Constitutional Rights, as Justice Sheila O'Brien has done.

Justice Sheila O'Brien has no respect for the law, does not comply with the law, does not instill public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, is not faithful to the law, and does not maintain professional competence in the law. Further, she conscientiously, arbitrarily, capriciously, deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly: (1) engaged in conduct in violation of her duty as a judge and of the Code of Judicial Conduct, including but not limited to Supreme Court Rules 62(A) and 63(A), (2) engaged in actions in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land and the law of Illinois, (3) engaged in acts of treason against the United States Constitution and the United States of America, (4) committed fraud upon the court, (5) engaged in acts as a trespasser of the law, (6) acted without or in excess of her lawful authority, (7) engaged in actions to coverup the unlawful act of judge-shopping, (8) committed fraud upon the State of Illinois, (9) aided and abetted criminal activity, (10) and connived with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County in covering up the disappearance of court records.

I request that a full and complete investigation into the willful violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by Justice Sheila O'Brien be made by the Judicial Inquiry Board.

Yours truly,

Eugene Alpern

cc:   Internet

bcc:

[fn2] Although the Chief Deputy Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County requested additional time to restore the file, the First District Appellate Court ordered the entire record of the 91-D-5122 trial court to be sent up as the record on appeal. Thus, both the entire record of the 91-D-5122 trial case and the record to be reviewed on appeal are identical.

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July 17, 1998