Editors Note: The following Motion is evidence that Judge Terence M. Sheen is ignorant of the law in cases other than the Kost case.  Thank you Mr. Nevers for exposing the judicial incompetence in the DuPage County Courts.
This site is available for exposing further incompetence in our courts. 

           Now comes David Nevers, on his own behalf, and moves this Court to reassign the above-named case, and in support of his Motion states:

1. That on May 1, 1998, Judge Sheen conducted a contempt hearing against Jeanine Nevers that resulted in a finding of guilty of indirect criminal contempt. Judge Sheen fined Jeanine Nevers $100.00.

On two occasions prior to that hearing, Judge Sheen offered Jeanine Nevers the right to be tried by a jury.

2. That on June 23, 1998, Judge Sheen informed David Nevers that he would be tried for indirect criminal contempt, and offered David Nevers the right to be tried by a jury.

3. That on June 23, 1998 David Nevers orally accepted Judge Sheen's offer of a jury trial. Judge Sheen instructed David Nevers to file a formal jury demand, and to pay the required jury fee.

4. On June 23, 1998, David Nevers filed his formal jury demand, and paid the sum of $180.00 to the Clerk of the Circuit Court for a 12 member jury. Copies of those documents are attached as Exhibits 'A' and 'B' respectively.

5. That on July 13, 1998, Judge Sheen informed David Nevers in open court that he had 'reconsidered' the maximum penalty he would impose if David Nevers was found guilty. Judge Sheen said he decided to lower the penalty to less than six months in jail, and less than $500.00 in fines. Judge Sheen further stated that under the rule of Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), David Nevers no longer qualified for a jury trial, and would be tried in a bench trial instead.

6. On July 13, 1998, and again on July 16, 1998, Judge Sheen refused to enter an appealable Order denying David Nevers' jury trial demand.

7. That on July 17, 1998, attorney Bruce Kelsey filed an amended pleading for indirect criminal contempt against David Nevers seeking a fine of less than $500.00 and less than six months in jail.

8. Judge Sheen has shown a bias against David Nevers as a pro se litigant, by offering a jury trial to Jeanine Nevers, represented by an attorney, but then withdrew a similar offer to David Nevers, who appears pro se.

9. That the U.S. Supreme Court said that the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense is to look at the penalty actually imposed. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, (1968) at 211.

10. In other words, Judge Sheen decided not to apply the Bloom v. Illinois test to Jeanine Nevers' May 1 contempt hearing, but to apply it retroactively to David Nevers to deny the jury trial he had already offered.

11. Rescinding a previous jury trial offer after a jury trial demand is made violates David Nevers' right of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and his Fifth Amendment right to due process.

12. In addition, Judge Sheen's July 13th comments that led to Bruce Kelsey's July 17th amended contempt petition filing were the equivalent of the Court offering legal advice from the bench for the benefit of an attorney, and against a pro se litigant.

13. That Judge Sheen has further demonstrated his bias against pro se litigants by refusing to follow the U.S. Supreme Court's guidelines regarding pro se pleadings as set forth in Haines v. Kerner, 92 S.Ct. 594. In Kerner, the Supreme Court held that pro se pleadings are not held to the same high standards of perfection as attorneys.

14. That on May 1, 1998, Judge Sheen entered an Order restricting or otherwise modifying David Nevers' visitation with his minor children. David Nevers states further that Judge Sheen entered that Order in a manner prohibited by State statute.

15. That 750 ILCS 5/607 requires that visitation be modified only if the Judge finds that the party bringing the motion for modification met the test of showing why the modification is in the children's best interest.

16. That the 750 ILCS 5/607 requires that visitation be restricted only upon a finding by the Court that the children would be subject to 'serious endangerment' if the restriction is not made.

17. That no pleading was ever brought before the Court seeking either a modification or restriction of David Nevers' visitation with his minor children. That no finding of 'best interest' or 'serious endangerment' was ever entered by this court prior to entering the May 1, 1998 Order. . "***The judge's discretion is limited by the Act which requires that the evidence fit the higher standard of endangerment prior to visitation restriction and that such a finding be explicitly set out before proceeding to modify in the best interests.***" In Re Marriage of Solomon, 84 Ill. App.3d 901, 405 N.E.2d 1289, (1980)

18. That the courts have long recognized the Constitutionally protected rights of parents vis-…-vis the care and contact with their minor children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 US 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, (1972), May v. Anderson, 345 US 528, 73 S. Ct. 840 (1952).

19. That when David Nevers' objected to the lack of a finding by the Court, Judge Sheen further attempted to wield visitation as a punishment, saying he would 'fix it so you don't get your children at all this weekend.' Visitation is for the benefit of the minor children and the non-custodial parent. Illinois courts have consistently held that visitation is not to be used as a punishment or a reward. Keefer v. Keefer, 107 Ill. App.2d 74, 245 N.E.2d 784 (1969), Valencia v. Valencia, 360 N.E.2d 1384 (1976).

20. That on August 13, 1998, Annette Ray, on behalf of Judge Sheen telephoned David Nevers to say that Judge Sheen would be otherwise occupied and unable to hear the matters scheduled for August 17, 1998, and that he [David Nevers] should not appear before the Court.

21. That Judge Sheen violated Rule 63(A)(4), Canon 3, of the General Rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois, by permitting attorney Bruce Kelsey to appear before him ex parte on August 17, and granted him leave to refile a defective fee petition. David Nevers had a Motion to Strike the prior fee petition, and that Motion was scheduled to be heard August 17th. That Rule 63(A)(4)(b) allows a judge to have ex parte communications only for scheduling purposes or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters or issues on the merits. Granting leave to refile ex parte before ruling on a Motion to Strike is a substantive matter that goes to the merits of the original fee petition.

Therefore, David Nevers moves this Court to reassign the above-named case.

______________________________
David Nevers

September 17, 1998

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December 15, 1998