)
In re Marriage of           )
                            )
CHRISTINE SZABLOWSKI,       ) No. 94 D 11666
        Petitioner          )
                            )
        and                 )
                            ) Judge Daniel Sullivan
PAUL SZABLOWSKI,            )
       Respondent           )
                            )
                            )

       NOW COMES the Respondent, Paul Szablowski ("Paul"), and moves this Court to vacate the order of December 22, 1998. In support of this Motion to Reconsider, along with his affidavit, Paul states:
    1. Shore's affidavit and the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage filed with that affidavit on January 13, 1999 is incorporated herein as a part of this Motion.
    2. That this court is a court of limited jurisdiction.
         A court hearing a divorce action is a court of limited jurisdiction. "When a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute." In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993); "Jurisdiction of any particular case depends on whether the jurisdiction of the court over a matter is controlled by statute. Though a court be one of general jurisdiction, when its power to act on a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction. Thus, before a court can procure jurisdiction to enforce a special statutory right, it is necessary that the petition filed pursuant to that statute contain on its face all of the necessary elements required by the statute." Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Const. Co., Inc., 101 Ill.App.3d 30, 40, 427 N.E.2d 797 (1st Dist. 1981).
         Our Supreme Court has held that "Courts of equity have no inherent power in cases of divorce. The jurisdiction of such courts to hear and determine divorce matters is conferred only by statute. While such courts may exercise their powers within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute, the jurisdiction depends upon the grant of the statute and not upon general equity powers." Strukoff v. Strukoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 60, 389 N.E.2d 1170, 1172-73 (1979).
       In cases where a court's power to act is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and the courts exercising jurisdiction over such matters must proceed within the strictures of the statute. In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993).
       When a court is "exercising a special statutory jurisdiction, it is governed by the same rules as courts of limited jurisdiction." Keal v. Rhydderick, 317 Ill. 231 (1925).
       In In re Marriage of Milliken, 199 Ill.App.3d 813, 557 N.E.2d 591 (1st Dist. 1990), the court stated that "The jurisdiction of a court in a dissolution proceeding is limited to that conferred by statute."
       No statute ever conferred any jurisdiction upon this court.
    3. That there is no presumption of jurisdiction in a court of limited jurisdiction. People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill.2d 77, 84 (1983); Wabash Area Development, Inc. v. Ind. Com., 88 Ill.2d 392 (1981); People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer, 36 Ill.2d 438, 223 N.E.2d 128 (1967).
    4. That a valid Petition complying with statutes was never filed with this case.
       Jurisdiction is not conferred upon this court of limited jurisdiction unless a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage is filed that complies with the statutes covering Petition. In re Contest of Elections for Governor, 93 Ill.2d 463, 474 (1983); Brown v. VanKeuren, 340 Ill. 118, 122 (1930).
    5. That 750 ILCS 5/403 covers the mandatory requirements for a legally valid Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. One of the mandatory requirements of 750 ILCS §403 is that a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage must be signed and must be verified. The Petition filed in case no. 94 D 11666, a copy of which has been previously filed with this court, was signed but was never verified. No notary signed the Petition, although it was falsely represented that the Petitioner had sworn to the truth of the allegations.
       The defective Petition filed in this cause also lacks other mandatory requirements of 750 ILCS 5/403. The failure of the Petition to comply in all respects with the statutes, at the time of filing such Petition, deprived the Court of obtaining jurisdiction.
    6. That no valid Petition was ever filed with this court, and therefore there was no compliance with 735 ILCS 5/2-201(a).
       All actions in Illinois Courts must comply with the Code of Civil Procedure statute 735 ILCS 5/2-201(a) before a court has any lawful authority.
    7. A defective complaint (Petition) does not invoke 735 ILCS 5/2-201(a), and therefore the Code of Civil Procedure does not permit the 94-D-11666 action to come before any court.
    8. That the record of the 94-D-1166 case does not support the conferring of jurisdiction upon this court.
        An allegation in an order that a court has jurisdiction is just an allegation, and must be established from the record of the case. State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill, 113 Ill.2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986) ("a court does not acquire jurisdiction by a mere recital contrary to what is shown in the record"); Lombard v. Elmore, 134 Ill.App.3d 898, 480 N.E.2d 1329 (1st Dist. 1985) ("a trial court's express finding that it has jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction.") ("a trial court's intent to retain jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction."); Hill v. Daily, 28 Ill.App.3d 202, 204, 328 N.E.2d 142 (1st Dist. 1975) ("Neither does the court acquire jurisdiction by a mere recital in an order, which is contrary to what is shown in the record").
    9. That the order of December 22, 1998 did not contain any findings within the record of this case by the court that it had jurisdiction.
       This court has a duty, and has no discretion not, to fully comply with the law as established by the Illinois Supreme Court. Flake v. Pretzel, 381 Ill. 498, 46 N.E.2d 375 (1943); Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 143, 133 N.E. 58 (1921). An order issued not in compliance with the law is void.
      An order issued by a court of limited jurisdiction must contain the findings of the court that it has jurisdiction. In re Jennings, 68 Ill.2d 125, 368 N.E.2d 864 (1977) ("in a special statutory proceeding an order must contain the jurisdictional findings prescribed by statute."); Zook v. Spannaus, 34 Ill.2d 612, 217 N.E.2d 789 (1966).
      The order of December 22, 1998, nor has any order issued in this case, "contain the jurisdictional findings prescribed by statute."
    10. That Paul had filed his "RESPONDENT'S MOTION DEMANDING PETITIONER PROVE THAT THE 94-D-11666 TRIAL COURT HELD SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION AND FOR OTHER RELIEF" on November 18, 1997. This Court ordered Paul to resend this Motion to all counsel on August 5, 1998.
    11. That at no time did the Petitioner prove, as required by law, that the court held jurisdiction. R.W. Sawant v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 Ill.2d 304, 489 N.E.2d 1360 (1986); Bindell v. City of Harvey, 212 Ill.App.3d 1042, 571 N.E.2d 1017 (1st Dist. 1991) ("the burden of proving jurisdiction rests upon the party asserting it."); Loos v. American Energy Savers, Inc., 168 Ill.App.3d 558, 522 N.E.2d 841 (1988) ("Where jurisdiction is contested, the burden of establishing it rests upon the plaintiff."; Prof. Group Travel v. Prof. Seminar Consult. 126 Ill.App.3d 1084, 483 N.E.2d 1291 (1985).
    12. That Judge Sullivan was informed on August 5, 1998 that the requirements for jurisdiction were not met in this action. [The Shore Affidavit previously filed with this court on January 13, 1999].
    13. That Judge Sullivan acknowledged to the reporter Ron Shore on August 5, 1998 that he did not have jurisdiction. [The Shore Affidavit previously filed with this Court on January 13, 1999].
    14. That the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage is fatally defective, and cannot be lawfully corrected. Not only does the Petition lack any verification, but other defects in the Petition prevent any conferring of jurisdiction on this court.
        The Petitioner must prove that the Petition strictly complies with statute; this she cannot do, nor has she ever proved that the Petition complies with the requisite statute, nor has she ever proved that this Court ever held jurisdiction.
    15. That no proof of jurisdiction was ever presented to this court.
    16. That this court was without jurisdiction from day one and Judge Sullivan knew it at all times since August 5, 1998 and reasonably should have known it from the outset had Judge Sullivan inspected the record of this case as he was legally required to do.
    17. That the order issued by Judge Sullivan on December 22, 1998 was a void order, and that Judge Sullivan knew it was a void order at the time he issued it.
    18. That a motion to vacate a void order does not fall with the requirements of 735 ILCS 2-1401, but under the requirements of 735 ILCS 2-1401(f). Under 735 ILCS 5-2-1401(f) there is no time limits under which it can be brought, one does not have to establish that the motion has merit, the doctrines of latches/due diligence and of res judicata do not apply, and it may be brought in any court, in any time, and even by third parties, as the order had no legal force or effect at any time.
        Paul suggests that Judge Sullivan either was knowledgeable of the law relative to void orders and decided to ignore the law, or he acted in violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that he know the law and comply with the law.
        In either event Judge Sullivan applied the wrong law to void orders.
        Justice delayed is Justice denied.
    19. That the order of December 22, 1998, being void, should be vacated.
    20. That all orders in case no. 94 D 11666 are void, as they were all issued without jurisdiction of the court, and all orders are void whether vacated or not.
    21. That all orders issued in case no. 94-D-11666 should be vacated.
    22. That a judge has a duty to, and has no legal discretion not to, vacate all void orders.
    23. That a motion to vacate a void order because a court lacks jurisdiction cannot be dismissed or denied, since this Court, as it lacks jurisdiction, has no lawful authority to do so. The People v. Brewer, 328 Ill. 472, 483 (1928) ("If it could not legally hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, – it had no authority to make that finding.").
        WHEREFORE, the Respondent prays that this court will:
    A.  vacate its purported order of December 22, 1998,
    B.  vacate all orders issued by this court in case no. 94-D-11666, and
    C.  sanction the attorneys for proceeding with an action that was never lawfully before this Court.

                                ___________________
                                Paul Szablowski

Paul Szablowski
4702 N. Olcott Ave.
Harwood Hts, IL 60656

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Created January 21, 1999